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I. HOW MANY KINDS OF STATES THERE ARE, AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE ACQUIRED
II. HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES
III. COMPOSITE PRINCIPALITIES
IV. WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AFTER HIS DEATH
V. THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR STATES THAT RULED BY THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED
VI. NEW PRINCIPALITIES THAT ARE ACQUIRED BY ONE'S OWN ARMS AND ABILITY
VII. NEW STATES THAT ARE ACQUIRED EITHER BY FORTUNE OR FOREIGN ARMS
VIII. THOSE WHO COME TO POWER BY WICKEDNESS
IX. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE
X. HOW THE POWER OF STATES SHOULD BE MEASURED
XI. THEOCRATIC PRINCIPALITIES
XII. MERCENARIES AND OTHER KINDS OF SOLDIERY
XIII. AUXILIARIES, COMPOSITE, AND ONE'S OWN ARMIES
XIV. ORGANIZING ONE’S OWN ARMY
XV. THE THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, ESPECIALLY PRINCES, ARE PRAISED OR BLAMED
XVI. GENEROSITY AND STINGINESS
XVII. CRUELTY AND COMPASSION, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED THAN FEARED
XVIII. HOW PRINCES SHOULD KEEP THEIR WORD
XIX. AVOIDING BEING DESPISED AND HATED
XX. ARE FORTRESSES AND MANY OTHER THINGS, TO WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT, USEFUL OR NOT?
XXI. HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF TO GAIN AUTHORITY
XXII. THE MINISTERS OF PRINCES
XXIII. AVOIDING FLATTERERS
XXIV. WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES
XXV. HOW STRONGLY FORTUNE CONTROLS HUMAN AFFAIRS, AND HOW TO INFLUENCE HER
XXVI. AN ADMONITION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS

I. HOW MANY KINDS OF STATES THERE ARE, AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE ACQUIRED

ALL states, all powers, that have held and hold rule over men have been and are either republics or principalities.

Principalities are either hereditary (in which the family has been long established) or they are new.

The new principalities are either entirely new (as was Milan to Francesco Sforza) or they are the annexed members of the hereditary state of the prince who has acquired them (as was the kingdom of Naples to that of the King of Spain).

Such dominions are acquired either by the arms of the prince himself or of others, or else by fortune or by ability. Thus acquired, they are accustomed either to live under a prince or to live in republican freedom.

II. HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES

I will leave out all discussion on republics, inasmuch as in another place I have written of them at length, and will address myself only to principalities. In doing so, I will keep to the order indicated above, and discuss how such principalities are to be ruled and preserved.

I say at once, there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary states, because they have longer accustomed to the family of their prince than new ones. Therefore, for a prince of average powers, to maintain himself in his state, it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs of his ancestors and to deal prudently with circumstances as they arise, unless he is deprived of the state by some extraordinary and excessive force. Moreover, if he would be so deprived of his state, whenever anything sinister happens to his conqueror, he will regain it back.

We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who could not have withstood the attacks of the Venetians in 1484, nor those of Pope Julius in 1510, unless he had been long established in his dominions. For the hereditary prince has less cause and less necessity to offend. Hence, it happens that he will be more loved. Moreover, unless extraordinary vices cause him to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that his subjects will be naturally well disposed towards him, because in the antiquity and duration of his rule the memories and motives that make for change are lost, for one change always leaves the tooth-stone for the next.

III. COMPOSITE PRINCIPALITIES

BUT the difficulties occur in a new principality. Firstly, if it be not entirely new but is a member of a state which, taken collectively, may be called composite. The changes arise chiefly from an inherent difficulty that is present in all new principalities. Men change their rulers willingly only then, when they hope to better selves. This hope induces them to take up arms against him who presently rules. In some cases, they are deceived -- because afterward, they find by experience that they have worsened own conditions. This follows also from another natural and common necessity that always causes a new prince to burden those who have submitted to him with his soldiery and with infinite other hardships that he must put upon his new acquisition.

In this way, you have enemies in all those whom you have injured while seizing that principality, because you are not able to keep those friends who put you there, because you are not able to satisfy them in the way they expected. That is why you cannot take strong measures against them, feeling bound to them. Although a prince may be very strong in armed forces, yet in entering a province, he has always needed of the goodwill of the natives.

For these reasons, Louis XII, King of France, quickly occupied Milan and lost it quickly as well, because to occupy it -- he needed only to get on own side the forces of Milanese Lodovico. However, those, who had opened the gates to Louis and found selves deceived in their hopes of the pre-conceived benefit, would not endure the ill treatment of the new prince. It is very true that, after acquiring rebellious provinces a second time, such princes were not so lightly losing them afterward, because those princes, with little reluctance, always took the opportunity of the rebellion to punish the delinquents, to clear out the suspects, and to strengthen self in the weakest places. Thus, to cause France to lose Milan for the first time, it was enough for the Duke Lodovico to raise insurrections on the borders of Milan. However, to cause him to lose it a second time, it was necessary to bring the whole world against him, and that his armies should be defeated and driven out of Italy. Those conditions follow from the causes above mentioned.

Nevertheless, Milan was taken from France both the first and the second time. The general reasons for the first have been discussed. It remains to name those for the second, and to see what resources the King of France had and what any one in his situation would have had for maintaining self more secure than that king did.

Now I say that those newly acquired dominions, which are added to an ancient state, are either of the same country and language or they are not. When they are -- it is easier to hold them, especially when they have not been accustomed to self-government. To hold them securely, it is enough to have destroyed the family of the previous prince. It is necessary because the two peoples, preserving in other things the old conditions and having nearly the same customs, will live quietly together -- as one has seen in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony, and Normandy that have been bound to France for so long a time. Although there may be some difference in language, the customs are alike, and the people will easily be able to get on amongst selves. One, who would annex them, if he wishes to hold them, has only to bear in mind two considerations: the one -- that the family of their former lord should be extinguished, the other -- that neither their laws nor their taxes should be altered. Thus, in a very short time, they would become entirely one body with the old principality.

However, there are difficulties when states are acquired in a country with the language, customs, and laws different from those of the motherland; and good fortune and great energy are needed to hold them. Therefore, one of the greatest and most real helps to that prince, who has acquired them, would be his own going there and residing amid the newly acquired subjects. This would make his position more secure and durable, as it has made that of the Turk in Greece. The latter, notwithstanding all the other measures taken by him for holding that state, if he had not settled there, would not have been able to keep it. If one is always on the spot, disorders are seen as they spring up and one can quickly remedy them. However, if one is not at hand and hear about disorders only when they are in a full bloom, he can no longer remedy them. Besides this, if your officials do not pillage the country, then, the subjects are satisfied by prompt recourse to the prince. Thus, wishing to be good, they have more cause to love him, and wishing to be otherwise, to fear him. He, who would attack that state from the outside, must have the utmost caution. As long as the prince resides there, it can only be wrested from him with the greatest difficulty.

The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places, which may be as keys to that state, for it necessary either to do this or else to keep there a great number of soldiers. A prince does not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense he can send them out and keep them there, and he offends only a minority of the citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them to the new inhabitants. Those whom he offends, remaining poor and scattered, are never able to injure him. Meanwhile, the rest, being uninjured, are easily kept quiet and, at the same time, are anxious not to err for fear it should happen to them as it has to those who have been despoiled.

In conclusion, I say that these colonies are not costly. Moreover, they are more faithful, they injure less, and the injured, as has been said, being poor and scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this, one has to remark that men ought either to be well treated or crushed, because they can avenge selves of lighter injuries, of ones that are more serious they cannot. Therefore, the injury that is to be done to a man ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in fear of revenge.

However, in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends much more, having to consume on the garrison all income from the state, so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are exasperated, because the whole state is injured. Through the shifting of the garrison up and down, all become acquainted with hardship. All become hostile; and they are enemies who, while beaten on their own ground, are yet able to do hurt. For every reason, therefore, such guards are as useless as a colony is useful.

Again, the prince who holds a country that is differ in the above respects ought to make himself the head and defender of his powerful neighbors -- to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking care that no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get a footing there. For it will always happen that such a one will be introduced by those, who are discontented either through excess of ambition or through fear, as one has seen already. The Aetolians brought the Romans into Greece. It was so in every country where the latter obtained a footing, because the inhabitants brought them in. The usual course of affairs is that -- as soon as a powerful foreigner enters a country, all the subject states are drawn to him, moved by the hatred, which they feel against the ruling dynasty. So that in respect to these subject states he has not to take any trouble to gain them over to himself, for the whole of them quickly rally to the state, which he has acquired there. He has only to take care that they do not get hold of too much power and too much authority, and then with his own forces, and with their goodwill, he can easily keep down the more powerful of them, so as to remain entirely master in the country. He who does not properly manage this business will soon lose what he has acquired, and while he does hold it, he will have endless difficulties and troubles.

The Romans, in the countries, which they annexed, observed closely these measures. They sent colonies and maintained friendly relations with the minor powers, without increasing their strength. They kept down the greater and did not allow any strong foreign powers to gain authority. Greece appears to me sufficient for an example. The Romans kept the Achaeans and Aetolians friendly, the kingdom of Macedonia was humbled, Antiochus was driven out. Yet the merits of the Achaeans and Aetolians never secured for them permission to increase their power nor did the persuasions of Philip ever induce the Romans to be his friends without first humbling him, nor did the influence of Antiochus make them agree that he should retain any lordship over the country. In those instances, the Romans did what prudent princes ought to do.

A prudent prince has to regard not only present troubles, but also future ones, for which he must prepare with energy, because, when foreseen, they are easy to be remedied. However, if you wait until they approach, the medicine is no longer in time -- because the malady has become incurable. For it happens in this, as the physicians say it happens in hectic fever, that in the beginning of the malady it is easy to cure but difficult to detect, but in the course of time, not having been either detected or treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to detect but difficult to cure. Thus it happens in affairs of state, for when the evils that arise have been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise man to see), they can be quickly redressed, but when, through not having been foreseen, they have been permitted to grow in a way that every one can see them. There is no longer a remedy.

Therefore, the Romans, foreseeing troubles, dealt with them at once. They might try to postpone a war, not letting troubles come to a head, for they knew that war is not to be avoided, but is only put off to the advantage of others. Moreover, they wished to fight with Philip and Antiochus in Greece so as not to have to do it in Italy. They could have avoided both, but this they did not wish. Nor did that ever please them, which is forever in the mouths of the wise ones of our time -- 'Let us enjoy the benefits of the time,' but rather the benefits of their own valor and prudence. For time drives everything before itself -- it is able to bring good as well as evil and evil as well as good.

However, let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any of the things mentioned. I will speak of Louis [XII], and not of Charles [VIII], as the one whose conduct is the better to be observed, because he have held possessions in Italy for the longest period; and you will see that he has done the opposite to those things which ought to be done to retain a state composed of divers elements.

King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, who desired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his intervention. I will not blame the course taken by the king, because, wishing to get a foothold in Italy and having no friends there and seeing rather that every door was shut to him because of the conduct of Charles, he was forced to accept those friendships that he could get. Moreover, he would have succeeded very quickly in his plan if in other matters he had not made some mistakes. However, having acquired Lombardy, the king regained the authority that Charles had lost -- Genoa yielded, the Florentines became his friends, the Marquis of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, the Bentivoglio, my lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of Pesaro, of Rimini, of Camerino, of Piombino, the Lucchesi, the Pisans, the Sienese. Everybody made advances to him to become his friend. Then could the Venetians realize the rashness of the course taken by them, which, in order that they might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made the king master of two-thirds of Italy.

Let any one now consider -- with what little difficulty the king could have maintained his position in Italy, had he observed the above-mentioned rules, thus keeping all his friends secure and protected. Although the latter were numerous, they were weak and timid -- some afraid of the Church, some of the Venetians. Thus, they would always have been forced to stand in with him; and by their means, he, himself, could be easily secured against those who remained powerful. However, he was no sooner in Milan than he did the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander to occupy the Romagna. It never occurred to him that by this action he was weakening himself, depriving himself of friends and those who had thrown themselves into his lap, while he aggrandized the Church by adding temporal power to the spiritual, thus giving it greater authority. Having committed this prime error, he was obliged to follow it up and to come into Italy in person in order to put an end to the ambition of Alexander and to prevent him of becoming the master of Tuscany. Moreover, as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church and deprived himself friends, Louis, wishing to have the kingdom of Naples, divided it with the King of Spain. Where he was the prime arbiter of Italy, he took an associate, so that the ambitious of that country and the malcontents of his own should have where to shelter. Whereas he could have left in his own new kingdom the old king as a pensioner, he drove him out. Moreover, he put there in charge one who was able to drive him, Louis, out... in turn.

The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men always do so when they can, and for this they will be praised not blamed; but when they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, then there is folly and blame. Therefore, if France could have attacked Naples with her own forces she ought to have done so. If she could not, then, she ought not to have divided it. And if the partition which she made with the Venetians in Lombardy was justified by the excuse that by it she got a foothold in Italy, this other partition merited blame, for it had not the excuse of that necessity.

Therefore, Louis made these five errors -- he destroyed the minor powers, he increased the strength of one of the greater powers in Italy, he brought in a foreign power, he did not settle in the country, he did not send colonies. Those errors, if he had lived, were not enough to injure him, had he not made a sixth by taking away their dominions from the Venetians. Had he not aggrandized the Church, nor brought Spain into Italy, it would have been very reasonable and necessary to humble them. However, having first taken these steps, he should never consent to their ruin. For they, being powerful, would always have kept off others from capturing Lombardy, to which the Venetians would never consent, except to become masters themselves there. Also the others would not wish to take Lombardy from France in order to give it to the Venetians and to run counter to both, they would not have had the courage.

If any one should say: ‘King Louis yielded the Romagna to Alexander and the kingdom of Naples to Spain in order to avoid war’, I answer for the reasons given above that a blunder ought never be perpetrated to avoid war, because it is not to be avoided but is only deferred to your disadvantage. If another should allege the pledge, which the king had given to the Pope that he would assist him in the enterprise, in exchange for the dissolution of his marriage and for the cardinal hat to Rouen, to that I reply what I shall write later on concerning the faith of princes, and how it ought to be kept.

Thus, King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the conditions observed by those who have taken possession of countries and wished to retain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but much that is reasonable and quite natural. On those matters I spoke at Nantes with Cardinal of Rouen, when Valentino* (as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope Alexander, was usually called) occupied the Romagna. [* From the duchy of Valentines, conferred on him by Louis XII.]

Cardinal said to me that the Italians did not understand war. I replied to him that the French did not understand statecraft, meaning that otherwise they would not have allowed the Church to reach such greatness. In fact, it has been seen that France has caused the greatness of the Church and of Spain in Italy, and her ruin may be attributed to them. From this example, a general rule might be drawn, which never or rarely fails -- that a prince, who was the cause of another becoming powerful, would be ruined himself. Because that predominance, he assisted in creation for another, he has brought about either by own astuteness or else by own force. However, another prince, who has been raised by him to power, would always distrust those qualities of his.

IV. WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AFTER HIS DEATH

CONSIDERING the difficulties, which men have had to hold a newly acquired state, some might wonder how Alexander the Great became the master of Asia in a few years and died while it was yet scarcely settled. To some of you it might appear reasonable to conclude that the whole empire would have rebelled. Nevertheless, his successors maintained selves, and had to meet no other difficulty than that, which arose among them from their own ambitions.

I answer that the principalities, of which one has record, are found to be governed in two different ways -- either by a prince (with a body of servants who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his favor and permission) or by a prince and barons (the latter hold the dignity of office by their pedigree, and not by the grace of the prince).

Such barons have states and their own subjects, who recognize them as lords and hold them in natural affection. Those states that are governed by a prince and his servants hold their prince in more consideration, because in all the country there is no one who is recognized as superior to him, and if they yield obedience to another they do it as to a minister and official, and they do not bear him any particular affection.

The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the King of France. One lord governs the entire monarchy of the Turk; the others are his servants. By dividing his kingdom into sanjaks, he sends in those places different administrators, and shifts and changes them as he chooses. But the King of France is placed in the midst of an ancient body of lords, acknowledged by their own subjects, and beloved by them; they have their own prerogatives that the king cannot take away, except at his own peril.

Therefore, he who considers both of these states will recognize great difficulties in seizing the state of the Turk. However, once it is conquered, it is easy to hold. The causes of the difficulties in seizing the kingdom of the Turk are that the members of the ruling family cannot call in the outsider-conqueror, nor can the latter hope to be assisted in his plan by the revolt of those whom the present prince has around him. This arises from the reasons given above; for his ministers, being all slaves and bondmen, can only be corrupted with great difficulty, and one can expect little advantage from them when they have been corrupted, as they cannot carry the people with them, for the reasons assigned. Hence, he who attacks the Turk must bear in mind that he will find him united. Therefore, the attacker has to rely more on own strength than on the revolt of others. However, if once the Turk prince has been conquered and routed in the field in such a way that he could not replace his armies, there would be nothing to fear but the family of the prince. If the latter would be exterminated, there would remain no one to fear. The others would have no credit with the people; and as the conqueror did not rely on them before his victory, so he ought not to fear them after it.

The contrary happens in kingdoms governed like that of France, because one can easily enter there by gaining over some baron of the kingdom, for one always finds malcontents and such as desire a change. Such men, for the reasons given, can open the way into the state and render the victory easy; but if you wish to hold it afterward, you meet with infinite difficulties, both from those who have assisted you and from those you have crushed. Nor is it enough for you to have exterminated the family of the prince, because the lords that remain make selves the heads of fresh movements against you. Moreover, as you are unable either to satisfy or exterminate them, that state is lost, whenever time brings the opportunity.

Now if you will consider what was the nature of the government of Darius, you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and therefore, it was only necessary for Alexander, first, to overthrow him in the field, and then, to take the country from him. After Alexander’s victory and Darius being killed, the state remained secure, for the above-mentioned reasons. Moreover, if Alexander’s successors had been united they would have enjoyed it securely and at their ease, for there were no tumults raised in the kingdom, except those they provoked themselves.

However, it is impossible to hold with such tranquility states constituted like that of France. Hence arose those frequent rebellions against the Romans in Spain, France, and Greece, owing to the many principalities over there, of which, as long as the memory of them endured, the Romans always held as insecure possessions. However, with the power and long continuance of the empire, the memory of them passed away, and the Romans at last became secure possessors. And when fighting afterward among selves, each one was able to attach to himself his own parts of the country, according to the authority he had assumed there; and the family of the former lord being exterminated, none other than the Romans were acknowledged.

When these things are remembered, no one would marvel at the ease with which Alexander held the Empire of Asia or at the difficulties that others have had to keep an acquisition, such as Pyrrhus and many more. This is not occasioned by the little or abundance of ability in the conqueror, but by the want of uniformity in the subject state.

V. THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR STATES THAT RULED BY THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED

WHENEVER those states, which have been acquired as stated, have been accustomed to live under their own laws and freedoms, there are three ways for those who wish to hold them. The first way is to ruin them, the next way is to reside there in person, and the third way is to permit them to rule by their own laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing within it an oligarchy, which will keep it friendly to you. Such a government, being created by the prince, knows that it cannot stand without his friendship and interest; therefore, it does its utmost to support him. Consequently, he, who would keep a city accustomed to freedom, will hold it more easily by the means of its own citizens than in any other way.

For example, there were the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held Athens and Thebes, establishing there an oligarchy. Nevertheless, they lost them. The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia, dismantled them, and did not lose them. They wished to hold Greece as the Spartans held it, making it free and permitting its laws; and they did not succeed. In order to hold it, they were compelled to dismantle many cities in Greece. For in truth, there is no safe way to retain them, unless ruining them. He, who becomes master of a city that accustomed to own freedoms and does not destroy that city, may expect to be destroyed by it. For in rebellion, it has always the watchword of liberty and its ancient privileges as a rallying point, which neither time nor benefits will ever cause it to forget. Whatever you may do or provide against, they never forget that name or their privileges, unless they are disunited or dispersed. In fact, at every chance they had, they immediately rallied to their previous freedoms, as Pisa after the hundred years the Florentines had held her in bondage.

However, when cities or states are accustomed to be ruled by a new prince, and the family of the old prince were being exterminated, they, being on the one hand accustomed to obey and on the other hand not having the old prince, cannot agree in making one mind from among selves. They do not know how to govern themselves. For this reason, they are very slow to take up arms. Therefore, the new prince can gain their loyalty and secure them much more easily. However, republics have more vitality, greater hatred, and more desire for vengeance, which will never permit them to allow the memory of their former prince and liberties to rest. Therefore, the safest way is to destroy them or to reside there.

VI. NEW PRINCIPALITIES THAT ARE ACQUIRED BY ONE'S OWN ARMS AND ABILITY

SPEAKING of entirely new principalities, as I shall do, let no one be surprised if I adduce the highest examples both of prince and of state. Walking almost in the same path as others did before and following by imitation their deeds, men are yet unable to keep entirely to the ways of others or attain to the power of those they imitate. A wise man should always follow the paths beaten by great men and imitate those who have been supreme, so that if his ability does not equal theirs, at least it will savor of it. Let him act like the clever archers who, aiming to hit the mark that yet appears too far distant and knowing the limits to the strength of their bows, shoot much higher than the mark. They try not to reach by their strength or arrow to so great a height, but to be able with the aid of so high an aim to hit the mark they wish to reach.

Therefore, I say that in entirely new principalities, where there is a new prince, more or less difficulty is found in keeping them, accordingly as there is more or less ability in him who has acquired the new state. Now, as the fact of becoming a prince from a private person presupposes either ability or fortune, it is clear that one or other of these two things will mitigate in some degree many difficulties.

Nevertheless, he who has relied least on fortune is established the strongest. Furthermore, it facilitates matters when the prince, having no other state, is compelled to reside there in person.

However, to come to those who, by their own ability and not through fortune, have risen to be princes, I say that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and like such are the excellent examples. Although one may not discuss Moses as the one who have been a mere executor of the will of God, yet one should admire Moses only for that favor, which made him worthy to speak with God. However, in considering Cyrus and others, who have acquired or founded kingdoms, all will be found admirable. If their particular deeds and conduct shall be considered, they will not be found inferior to those of Moses, although the latter had so great a preceptor.

In examining their actions and lives one cannot see that they owed anything to fortune beyond opportunity, which brought them the material to mould into the form which seemed best to them. Without that opportunity, their powers of mind would have been extinguished, and without those powers, the opportunity would have come unrecognizable, and therefore, in vain.

Moses was necessitated to find his people in Egypt, enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians. He found them in that state for they should be disposed to follow him to be delivered out of bondage. It was necessary that Romulus should not remain in Alba, and that he should be abandoned at his birth, in order that he would become King of Rome and founder of the fatherland. It was necessary that Cyrus should find the Persians discontented with the government of the Medes, and the Medes soft and effeminate through their long peace. Theseus could not have shown his ability had he not found the Athenians dispersed. These opportunities, therefore, made those men fortunate, and their high ability enabled them to recognize the opportunity, whereby their country was ennobled and made famous.

Those who by valorous ways become princes, like these men, acquire a principality with difficulty, but they kept it with ease. The difficulties they have in acquiring it arise in part from the new rules and methods that they are forced to introduce while establishing their own government and its security. It should be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things. It is so, because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions and lukewarm defenders in those who may yet do well under the new. This coolness of partisans arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the old laws on their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not readily believe in new things until they have had a long experience of them. Thus, it happens that whenever those, who are hostile, having the opportunity to attack, do it like fanatics. Meanwhile, the others defend lukewarmly and in such wise that the new prince is endangered along with them.

It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter thoroughly, to inquire whether these innovators can rely on selves or have to depend on others: that is to say, whether to consummate their enterprise while having use prayers or can they use force? In the first instance, they always succeed badly and never accomplish anything. However, when they can rely on selves and use force, then, they are rarely endangered. Hence, it is that all armed prophets have conquered, and the unarmed ones have been destroyed.

Besides the reasons mentioned, the nature of the people is variable, and while it is easy to persuade them, it is difficult to fix them in that persuasion. Thus, it is necessary to take such measures that, when they believe no longer, it may be possible to make them believe by force.

If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus had been unarmed, they could not have enforced their constitutions for long. That what happened in our time to Bishop Girolamo Savonarola, who was ruined with his new order of things immediately after the multitude cease to believe in him, because he had no material means of keeping steadfast those who continued to believe or of compelling the unbelievers to believe. Therefore, such leaders as these have great difficulties in consummating their enterprise, for all dangers are in their ascent, yet with ability, they will overcome them. However, after these difficulties are overcome, and those who envied the new leader’s success are exterminated, the new prince will begin to be respected, and he will continue to be powerful, secure, honored, and happy.

To these great examples, I wish to add a lesser one although it still bears some resemblance to them. I hope it would suffice for all that kind. I am talking about Hero of the Syracusans. This man rose from a private person to be Prince of the Syracusans. He did not owe anything to fortune, but only to opportunity, for the Syracusans, being oppressed, chose him for their captain. Afterward, the Syracusans rewarded him by the title of their prince. He was of so great ability, even as a private citizen, that one, who writes of him, says, ‘he wanted nothing but a kingdom to be a king’. This man abolished the old soldiery, organized the new, gave up old alliances, made new ones; and as he had his own soldiers and allies, on such foundations he was able to build any edifice. Thus, while he had endured much trouble in acquiring his state, he had but little in keeping it.

VII. NEW STATES THAT ARE ACQUIRED EITHER BY FORTUNE OR FOREIGN ARMS

THOSE who solely by good fortune become princes from being private citizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop. They have not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they have many when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some state is given either for money or by the favor of him who bestows it. It happened to many cities in Greece (in Ionia and the Hellespont). Darius appointed his quasi-princes over there in order that they might hold those cities for his security and for his glory. Some Roman emperors, who became the emperors from being the private persons by corrupting the soldiers, did the same. Such stand simply upon the goodwill and the fortune of him who has elevated them are two most inconstant and unstable things. They either have lacked the knowledge required for that position or they were not men of great worth and ability. Therefore, it is not reasonable to expect that they would know how to command, having always lived in the private conditions. Besides, they cannot hold the position of a prince, because they have not forces, which they can keep friendly and faithful.

States that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature that are born and grow rapidly, cannot have their foundations and relations with other states, fixed in such a way that the first storm would not overthrow them. Unless, as is said, those, who unexpectedly become princes, are men of so much ability that they know they have to be prepared at once to hold that, which fortune has thrown into their laps. They know they have to lay foundations of the state afterward they got on its top; whereas, the normal way of others -- have laid foundation of their power before they became princes.

Concerning these two methods of rising to be a prince by ability or fortune, I wish to adduce two examples within our own recollection, and these are Francesco Sforza and Cesare Borgia.

Francesco, by proper means and with great ability, from being a private person, rose to be Duke of Milan. This state, which he had acquired with a thousand anxieties, he kept with little trouble. On the other hand, Cesare Borgia, called by the people Duke Valentino, acquired his state during the ascendancy of his father. Therefore, after his father's decline, he lost it. He lost it despite he had taken every measure and done all that should be done by a wise and able man to fix firmly his roots in the state that the arms and fortunes of others had bestowed on him.

As was stated above, he, who has not first laid his foundations, may be able with great ability to lay them afterward. However, those foundations will be laid with troubles to the architect and with dangers to the entire building. Therefore, if all the steps taken by the duke were considered, it will be seen that he laid solid foundations for his future power. I do not consider it superfluous to discuss them, because I do not know what better precepts to give a new prince than the example of his actions. If his dispositions were of no avail, that was not his fault, but the extraordinary and extreme malignity of fortune.

Alexander VI, in wishing to aggrandize the duke, his son, had many immediate and prospective difficulties. Firstly, he did not see his way to make him master of any state that was not a state of the Church. If he was willing to rob the Church, he knew that the Duke of Milan and the Venetians would not consent, because Faenza and Rimini were already under the protection of the Venetians. Besides this, he saw the arms of Italy, especially those by which he might have been assisted, in hands that would fear the aggrandizement of the Pope, namely -- the Orsini, the Colonna, and their followers. Therefore, it behooved him to upset this state of affairs and embroil the powers to make self securely master of part of their states. This was easy for him to do, because he found the Venetians, moved by other reasons, inclined to bring back the French into Italy.

Alexander VI would not oppose this; moreover, he would render it easier by dissolving the former marriage of King Louis. Therefore, the king came into Italy with the assistance of the Venetians and the consent of the Pope. Louis was no sooner in Milan than Alexander had soldiers from him for the attempt on the Romagna, which yielded to him on the reputation of the king.

Thus, two things hindered Duke Valentino, having acquired the Romagna and beaten the Colonna, while wishing to hold that and to advance further. The one -- his forces did not appear loyal to him; the other -- the goodwill of France, that is to say, he feared that the forces of the Orsini, which he was using, would not stand to him. That not only might the Orsini hinder him from winning more, but they might seize what he had already won; and that the King might also do the same. Of the Orsini, he had a warning when, after taking Faenza and attacking Bologna, he saw them go very unwillingly to that attack. As to the king, he learned his mind when he himself, after taking the duchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany and the king made him desist from that undertaking. Hence, the duke decided to depend no more upon the arms and the luck of others.

Therefore, firstly, the duke weakened the Orsini and Colonna parties in Rome by gaining to himself all their adherents who were nobles, by making them his nobles. He did that by giving them good pay, honoring them in accord with their rank in his office, and commanding them in such a way that in a few months all attachments to the factions were destroyed and turned entirely to the duke. After this, he awaited an opportunity to crush the Orsini, having scattered the adherents of the Colonna. Such an opportunity came to him soon, and he used it well. For the Orsini, perceiving at length that the aggrandizement of the duke and the Church was ruin to them, called a meeting at Magione, in the territory of Perugia. From this sprung the rebellion at Urbino and the tumults in the Romagna, with endless dangers to the duke, all of which he overcame with the help of the French.

Having restored his authority, not to leave it at risk by trusting either to the French or other outsiders, he had recourse to his wiles. He knew so well how to conceal his mind that, by the mediation of Signor Paolo [Orsini] - whom the duke did not fail to secure with all kinds of attention, giving him money, apparel, and horses - the Orsini were reconciled, so that their simplicity brought them into his power at Sinigaglia. Having exterminated the leaders, and turned their partisans into his friends, the duke had laid sufficiently good foundations to his power, having all the Romagna and the duchy of Urbino. When the people of those territories began to appreciate their prosperity, he gained them all over to himself. As this point is worthy of notice, and to be imitated by others, I am not willing to leave it out.

When the duke occupied the Romagna, he found it under the rule of weak masters, who rather plundered their subjects than ruled them. Consequently, he gave them more cause for disunion with old masters than for union with them. That is why the country was full of robbery, quarrels, and every kind of violence. Therefore, wishing to bring back peace and obedience to authority, he considered it necessary to give it a good governor. Thereupon, he promoted Messer Ramiro d'Orco, a swift and cruel man, whom he fully authorized. In a short time, this man restored peace and unity with the greatest success. Afterward, the duke considered that it was not advisable to confer such excessive authority, for he had no doubt but that Ramiro would become odious. Thereafter, he set up a court of judgment in the country, under a most excellent president, wherein all cities had their advocates. He knew that the past severity had caused some hatred against him. Therefore, to clear himself in the minds of the people and gain them entirely to himself, he desired to show that if any cruelty had been practiced, it had not originated with him but derived from the natural sternness of his minister. Under this pretence, he took Ramiro, and one morning caused him to be executed and left on the piazza at Cesena with the block and a bloody knife at his side. The barbarity of this spectacle caused the people to be at once satisfied and dismayed.

However, let us return whence we started. I say that the duke, finding himself now sufficiently powerful and partly secured from immediate dangers by having armed himself in his own way and having in a great measure crushed those forces in his vicinity that could injure him if he wished to proceed with his conquest, had next to consider France. For he knew that King of France, who belatedly was aware of own mistake, would not support him. From this time, he began to seek new alliances and to temporize with Louis in the expedition that the latter was making towards the kingdom of Naples against the Spaniards who were besieging Gaeta. It was the duke’s intention to secure self against all of them, and this he would have quickly accomplished had Alexander lived.

Such was the duke’s line of action as to present affairs. As to the future, he had to fear, in the first place, that a new successor to the Church might not be friendly to him and might seek to take from him that, which Alexander had given him. Therefore, he decided to act in four ways:
Firstly, by exterminating the families of those lords whom he had despoiled, to take away that pretext from the new Pope.
Secondly, by winning to himself all the nobles of Rome, to be able to curb the Pope with their aid, as has been observed.
Thirdly, by converting the College of Cardinals on his own side.
Fourthly, by acquiring so much power before the old Pope should die that he could, by his own measures, resist the first shock.

Of these four ways, at the death of his father, Alexander, he had accomplished three. He had killed as many of the dispossessed lords as he could lay hands on, and few had escaped; he had won over the Roman nobles, and he had the most numerous party in the College of Cardinals. As to any fresh acquisition, he intended to become master of Tuscany, for he already possessed Perugia and Piombino, and Pisa was under his protection. As he had no longer to study France (for the French were already driven out of the kingdom of Naples by the Spaniards, and in this way both were compelled to buy his goodwill), he pounced down upon Pisa. After this, Lucca and Siena yielded at once, partly through hatred and partly through fear of the Florentines. The latter would have had no remedy had he continued to prosper, as he was prospering the year that Alexander died. For he had acquired so much power and reputation that he would have stood by himself and no longer have depended on the luck and the forces of others, but solely on his own power and ability.

However, Alexander died five years after the duke had first drawn the sword. The latter managed to consolidate only the state of Romagna, with the rest in the air, between two most powerful hostile armies; and he got sick unto death. Yet there were in the duke such valor and ability, and he knew so well how men are to be won or lost. Moreover, in so short a time, he had laid so firm the foundations of his state that if he had not had those armies on his back or if he had been in good health, he would have overcome all difficulties. It is seen that his foundations were good, for the Romagna awaited him for more than a month. In Rome, although half alive, he remained secure; and while the Baglioni, the Vitelli, and the Orsini might come to Rome, they could not effect anything against him. If he could not have made Pope him, whom he wished, at least the one whom he did not wish would not have been elected. However, if he had been in sound health at the death of Alexander, everything would have been easy to him. On the day that Julius II was elected, he told me that he had thought of everything that might occur at the death of his father, and had provided a remedy for all, except that he had never anticipated that, when the death did happen, he himself would be on the death bed.

When all the actions of the duke are recalled, I do not know how to blame him, but rather it appears to me, as I have said, that I ought to offer him for imitation to all those who, by the fortune or the arms of others, are raised to govern others. Having a lofty spirit and far-reaching aims, he could not have regulated his conduct otherwise, and only the shortness of the life of Alexander and his own sickness frustrated his plans. Therefore, he, who considers it necessary to secure self in own new state, to win friends, to overcome either by force or intellect, to make himself feared and beloved by the people, to be followed and revered by the soldiers, to exterminate those who have power or reason to hurt him, to change the old order of things for new, to be severe and gracious, magnanimous and liberal, to destroy a disloyal soldiery and to create new, to maintain friendship with kings and princes in such a way that they must help him with zeal and offend with caution, cannot find a more lively example than the actions of this man.

He can be blamed only for the election of Julius II, in whom he made a bad choice. As is said, not being able to elect a Pope to his own mind, he could have hindered any other from being elected Pope. He should never have consented to the election of any cardinal whom he had injured or who had cause to fear him if they became pontiffs, for injured men are either fear or hate their offenders. Those, whom he had injured, among others, were San Pietro ad Vincula, Colonna, San Giorgio, and Ascanio. [Julius II had been Cardinal of San Pietro ad Vincula; San Giorgio was Raffaells Riaxis, and Ascanio was Cardinal Ascanio Sforza.] Any one of the others, on becoming Pope, would have had to fear him; only Rouen and the Spaniards were acceptable. The Spaniards -- from their relationship and obligations, the cardinal of Rouen -- from his influence and having relations with the kingdom of France. Therefore, above everything, the duke ought to have created a Spaniard Pope, and, failing him, he ought to have consented to Rouen and not to San Pietro ad Vincula. He, who believes that new benefits will cause to forget old injuries, is deceived. Therefore, the duke erred in his choice, and it was the cause of his ultimate ruin.

VIII. THOSE WHO COME TO POWER BY WICKEDNESS

ALTHOUGH a prince may grow from a private person in two ways, neither of which can be entirely attributed to his fortune or ability, yet it is manifest to me that I must not be silent on them. One way could be more copiously treated when I discuss republics. These ways of ascend may be either by his own wickedness and nefariousness or by the favor of his fellow-citizens, who like him to be their prince. Speaking of the first way, it will be illustrated without entering further into the subject by two examples: one -- ancient, the other – modern. I consider these two examples as sufficient to those who may be compelled to follow them.

Agathocles, the Sicilian, became King of Syracuse not only from a private person but also from a low and abject birth. This man, the son of a potter, through all the changes in his fortune, always led an infamous life. Nevertheless, he accompanied his infamies with so much ability of mind and body that, having devoted himself to the military profession, he rose through its ranks to be Praetor of Syracuse. Being established in that position, and having deliberately resolved to make himself prince and to seize by violence, without obligation to others, that which had been conceded to him by assent, he came to an understanding for this purpose with Hamilcar, the Carthaginian, who, with his army, was fighting in Sicily.

One morning he assembled the people and senate of Syracuse, as if he had to discuss with them things relating to the Republic, and at a given signal the soldiers killed all the senators and the richest of the people. Having all noblemen dead, he seized and held the government of that city without any civil commotion. Although he was twice routed by the Carthaginians, and ultimately besieged, yet not only was he able to defend his city, but leaving part of his men for its defense, with the others, he attacked Africa, thus, in a short time raising the siege of Syracuse. The Carthaginians, reduced to extreme necessity, were compelled to come to terms with Agathocles and, leaving Sicily to him, had to be content with their possession of Africa.

Therefore, he, who considers the actions and the genius of this man, will see nothing or little that can be attributed to fortune. Inasmuch as he attained pre-eminence, as is shown above, not by the favor of any one, but step-by-step in the military profession, those steps were gained with a thousand troubles and perils, and were afterward boldly held by him with many hazards and dangers. Yet, it cannot be called talent to slay fellow-citizens, to deceive friends, to be without faith, without mercy, without religion. Such methods may gain empire, but not glory. Still, if the courage of Agathocles in entering into and extricating himself from dangers were considered, together with his greatness of mind in enduring overcoming hardships, it cannot be seen why he should be esteemed less than the most notable rulers. Nevertheless, his barbarous cruelty and inhumanity with infinite wickedness do not permit us to celebrate him among the excellent men. What he achieved cannot be attributed either to fortune or to genius.

In our times, during the rule of Alexander VI, Oliverotto da Fermo has been left an orphan many years before, and he was brought up by his maternal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani. In the early days of his youth, Oliverotto was sent to fight under Paolo Vitelli. Being trained under Vitelli’s discipline, he might attain some high position in the military profession. After Paolo died, he fought under his brother Vitellozzo. In a very short time, being endowed with wit and a vigorous body and mind, Oliverotto became the first man in his profession. However, it appearing to him a paltry thing to serve under others, and he resolved, with the aid of some citizens of Fermo, to whom the slavery of their country was dearer than its liberty, and with the help of the Vitelli, to seize Fermo.

So, he wrote to his uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, that, having been away from home for many years, he wished to visit him and his city and, in some measure, to look into his patrimony. Although he had not labored to acquire anything except honor, yet in order that the citizens should see he had not spent his time in vain, he desired to come honorably. Therefore, one hundred horsemen, his friends and retainers would accompany him. He would entreat Giovanni to arrange that he should be received honorably by the citizens of Fermo, all of which would be not only to his honor, but also to that of Giovanni himself, who had brought him up.

Giovanni, therefore, did not fail in any attentions due to his nephew. He caused his nephew to be honorably received by the Fermans, and he lodged the latter in his own house, where, having passed some days, and having arranged what was necessary for his wicked plan. Then Oliverotto gave a solemn banquet to which he invited his uncle and the nobles of Fermo. When the viands and all the other entertainments that are usual in such banquets were finished, Oliverotto artfully began a certain polemic, speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander and his son Cesare, and of their enterprises. Giovanni and others answered to that polemic, but he rose at once, saying that such matters should be discussed in a more private place. He suggested to retreat into a private chamber, and Giovanni and the others went in after him.

No sooner were they seated than soldiers came out from secret places and slaughtered Giovanni, and the rest. After these murders, Oliverotto mounted on horseback, rode up and down the town and besieged the chief magistrate in the palace, so that in fear the people were forced to obey him, and to form a new government, of which he made himself the prince. He killed all the malcontents, who were able to injure him, thus, strengthening self with new civil and military ordinances in such a way that, in the year during which he held that state, not only was he secure in the city of Fermo, but he had become formidable to all his neighbors. His destruction would have been as difficult as that of Agathocles if he had not allowed himself to be overreached by Cesare Borgia, who took him with the Orsini and Vitelli at Sinigaglia, as was stated above. Thus, one year after he had committed this parricide, he was strangled, together with Vitellozzo, who was his hero in valor and wickedness.

Some may wonder how it can happen that Agathocles, and his like, after infinite treacheries and cruelties, should live securely for long in his country. Moreover, how he could defend self from external enemies and never be conspired against by his own citizens. On the other hand, many others, by means of cruelty, have never been able even in peaceful times to hold the state, still less in the doubtful times of war. I believe that this follows from how badly or properly those cruelties and wickedness were used.

Those cruelties and wickedness may be called properly used (if it is permissible to talk in this way of what is evil) when they are applied at once and are necessary to one's security, and when they are not persisted in afterward unless they can be turned to the good of one’s subjects. The badly employed cruelties are those which, notwithstanding they may be few and weak in the commencement, grow in time in number and intensity rather than decreasing.

Those who use the first method can, with divine and human assistance, mitigate in some degree their rule, as Agathocles did. The others who use the second method cannot possibly stay in power.

Hence, it should be noted that, in seizing a state, the conqueror should thoroughly examine all those injuries that he must inflict on his new subjects and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to repeat them daily. In this way, he will be able to set men’s minds at rest and win them over to self by conferring their benefits. Whoever acts otherwise, either through timidity or bad advice, is always compelled to keep the knife in his hand. Neither can he rely on his subjects nor can they attach selves to him while suffering fresh and continuous violence. For injuries ought to be done all at one time, so that people can forget what it tastes like and so be less resentful. Benefits ought to be conferred gradually, so that the flavor of them might be perceived longer.

Above all things, a prince must live among his people in such a way that no circumstances, whether favorable or adverse, would make his conduct capricious. Because if the necessity for this comes in troubled times, it is too late for harsh measures. On the other hand, your favors are profitless to you, for they are considered as being forced from you; therefore, no one is under any obligation to you for them.

IX. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE

BUT coming to the other point, where a private citizen becomes the ruler of his country neither by wickedness nor by any intolerable violence, but by the favor of his fellow-citizens. This may be called a constitutional state -- neither valor alone nor fortune altogether necessary to attain to it, but rather a lucky astuteness. I say that such a state is obtained either by the favor of the people or by the favor of the nobles. In all cities, these two distinct parties are found; and the people are everywhere anxious not to be dominated or oppressed by the nobles and the nobles wish to rule and oppress the people. From these two opposite desires derives one of three results -- a principality, republic, or anarchy.

A principality is created either by the people or by the nobles, in accord with what a class has the opportunity. For the nobles, seeing they cannot withstand the people, begin to cook up the reputation of one of selves and making him a prince, so that under his shadow they can achieve their own ends. The people, finding they cannot resist the nobles, also cry up the reputation of one of selves and making him a prince to be defended by his authority. Whoever obtains sovereignty by the assistance of the nobles maintains self with more difficulty than that one who comes to power by the aid of the people, because the former finds himself with many around him who consider themselves his equals. Because of that, he cannot command or manage them, as he wants. However, whoever reaches sovereignty by popular favor, finds self on top and alone, and has none around him or few who are not prepared to take his orders.

Besides this, it is impossible to satisfy the nobles honorably, without injuring the interests of others. However, the prince can easily satisfy the people, for their object is more righteous than that of the nobles, because the latter wish to oppress the people, while the former only desire not to be oppressed. Moreover, a prince can never secure self against a hostile people, because of their great number; however, he can easily secure self against the nobles, who are few. The worst that a prince may expect from a hostile people is to be abandoned by them. However, from hostile nobles he has to fear not only desertion but also for own life. For the nobles, being in these affairs more far seeing and astute, always come forward in time to safeguard their interest, and they take sides with the one whom they expect to prevail. Further, the prince is necessitated to live always with the same people, but he can do well without the same nobles, being able to make or unmake them daily and to give them or take away from them his authority when he pleases.

Therefore, to make this point clearer, I say that the nobles ought to be looked at mainly in two ways: that is to say, they either conduct selves in such a way that binds them entirely to your fortune, or they do not. Those, who do bind selves and are not rapacious, ought to be honored and loved. Those, who remain independent of you, do so for two reasons – pusillanimity or ambition. If they are pusillanimous and naturally lacking of courage, they should be used, especially those who are capable of giving good advice, since they will respect you when you are doing well, and you will have nothing to fear from them in times of adversity. But when they are independent of you for their own ambitious ends, it is a token that they are giving more thought to own interests than to yours. Consequently, a prince ought to guard self against such nobles and to fear them as if they were open enemies, because in adversity they always help to ruin him.

Whoever becomes a prince through the favor of the people must work to retain their friendship; and this is easy for him because the people ask only not to be oppressed. However, one, who becomes a prince against the will of the people and by the favor of the nobles, should, above everything, try to win the people over; and this he may easily do if he takes them under his protection. Men, when they benefited from someone they expected to do them ill, are bound more closely to their benefactor. In such a way, the people can quickly become more devoted to the prince as if he had seized power by their favors. There are many ways, in which a prince can win their affections. However, they vary according to circumstances, so no definite rule can be given and I shall not deal with them here. I only conclude that it is necessary for a prince to have the people friendly; otherwise, he has no security in adversity.

Nabis, Prince of the Spartans, withstood the attacks of all Greece and a victorious Roman army, and successfully defended his country and his own authority against them. All he had to do, when danger threatened, was to take steps against a few of his subjects; but this would not have been sufficient if the people had been hostile to him. Do not let any one impugn this statement with the trite proverb that, 'he who builds on the people, builds on the mud'. For that may be so, when a private citizen bases his power on the people and takes it for granted the people will rescue him when he is oppressed by his enemies or by the magistrates. Wherein, he would find himself very often deceived, as happened with the Gracchi in Rome and Messer Giorgio Scali in Florence. However, if it is a prince who builds his power on the people, one who can command and is a man of courage, undismayed in adversity, who does not fail to take precautions, and who wins allegiance the whole people by his personal resolution and energy and the institutions he establishes, he will never be let down by the people. He will be found to have laid the foundation of his power securely.

Principalities are usually in danger when they are passing from the constitutional to the absolute order of government, for such princes either rule personally or through magistrates. In the latter case, their government is weaker and more insecure because it rests entirely on the goodwill of those citizens who are raised to the magistracy and who, especially in troubled times, can destroy the government with great ease, either by intrigue or open defiance. Therefore, the prince has not the chance amid tumults to exercise absolute authority, because the citizens, being accustomed to receive orders from magistrates, are not of a mind to obey him amid these confusions. In a crisis, he will always have acute necessity of men whom he can trust. For such a prince cannot rely upon what he has experienced in times of tranquility, when the citizens have need of his government. When things are quiet, everyone dances attendance and makes promises, and everybody would die for him so long as death is far off. However, in troubled times, when the state has need of its citizens, there are few to be found. Since this test of loyalty can be made only once, it is all the more dangerous to the prince.

Therefore, a wise prince ought to adopt such a course that his citizens will always and in all circumstances dependent on him and on his authority; thus, they will always be faithful to him.

X. HOW THE POWER OF STATES SHOULD BE MEASURED

IT is necessary to consider another point in examining the character of these principalities; that is, whether a prince has such power that in case of necessity he can support self with own resources or whether he has to always recourse to the protection of others. To make this quite clear, I say that I consider those princes are able to support selves by their own resources who can either by abundance of men or money raise a sufficient army to an encounter with any aggressor. In the same way, those princes are always in the need of protection of others who cannot take the field against the enemy but are forced to defend selves by sheltering behind walls. The first case has been discussed, but we will speak of it again should it recur. As for the second case, nothing can be said except to advise such princes to fortify and provision their towns and not to worry about the countryside. Whoever has fortified his town well and has organized his government in the way stated above (and I will say more about this later), then the enemy will be very circumspect in attacking him. For men always dislike enterprises where the difficulties can be seen; and it is obviously not easy to assault a town that is well fortified by the prince who is not hated by the people.

The cities of Germany are free. They own but little country around them and they yield obedience to the emperor when it suits them. Neither do they fear the emperor nor any other power that might be near them. They are fortified in such a way that every one thinks the taking of them by assault would be tedious and difficult because they have proper ditches and walls. They have sufficient artillery, and they always keep in public depots enough for one year's eating, drinking, and firing. Beyond this, to keep the people quiet and without loss to the state, they always have a year’s supply of the means to work at those trades that give them their livelihood and are the source of strength of their government. They also hold military exercises in a high repute and have many ordinances to uphold such activities.

Therefore, a prince, who has a well-fortified city and has not made himself hateful by the people, would not be attacked. For even if he would be besieged, the besieger would have to abandon the enterprise with ignominy, because affairs of this world are so variable that it is almost impossible to keep an army a whole year in the field in idleness. Whoever should reply, that 'if the people have most of their property outside the city and see it burnt, they would not remain patient; thus, the long siege and self-interest would make them forget their duty to the prince'. My answer to this is that once a powerful and courageous prince might overcome all such difficulties by giving hope to his subjects that the ills will not last long. At another time, he might exaggerate the cruelty of his enemy thus intensifying their fear of foreigners; meanwhile, he should take effective measures against those subjects who are too outspoken.

Further, the foes of the prince, on their arrival, would naturally burn and pillage the countryside at the time when the spirit of the people is still high and ready for the defense. Therefore, the prince should not worry too much, because when the people’s spirit would be cooled, the damage has been already done, the ills were incurred, and there would be no remedy for that. Therefore, the subjects would identify selves even more with their prince, because their country-houses would be destroyed and the prince’s enemy would become their enemy. Thus, they would be ready to unite with their prince, who appearing to be under obligations to them now that their houses have been burnt and their possessions ruined in his defense, for it is the nature of men to be bound by the benefits they confer, as much as by those they receive. Therefore, if everything were well considered, it would not be difficult for a prudent prince to keep the minds of his citizens steadfast during a siege, so long as he has adequate provisions and means of defense.

XI. THEOCRATIC PRINCIPALITIES

IT now remains to discuss of theocratic principalities, touching which, all difficulties are before getting possession, because they are acquired either by ability or by fortune, but can be kept without the help of either. For they are sustained by the religious institutions, which are so powerful and of such a character that, no matter how the ruler acts and lives, they safeguard his government. Although such principalities are not defended, they are not taken away from their rulers, who have subjects and do not rule them. The subjects, although not ruled, do not care and have neither the desire nor the ability to alienate selves from the ruler. Therefore, only these principalities are secure and happy. However, being upheld by powers, which the human mind cannot comprehend, I shall not argue about them. They are exalted and maintained by God, and it would be presumptuous on my part to discuss them -- this can be done only by a rash man.

Nevertheless, if any one should ask me -- how it comes that the Church has attained such greatness in temporal power? We can see that from Alexander and backwards, the Italian potentates (not only those who have been called potentates, but every baron and lord, though the smallest) have valued the power of the Church for nothing, yet now a king of France trembles before it. Moreover, the Church has been able to drive him from Italy and to ruin the Venetians. I should not think it superfluous to recall to some extent how it happened, although the story is well known.

Before Charles, King of France, invaded Italy, the pope, the Venetians, the king of Naples, the duke of Milan, and the Florentines ruled this country. These potentates had two main preoccupations -- the one, that no foreign power should invade Italy; the other, that no one among selves should seize more territory. Those who had especially to be watched were the pope and the Venetians.

To hold the Venetians in check, a confederation* of all the others was necessary, as it was for the defense of Ferrara. [*Seeking to expand her land empire, Venice declared war on Ferrara in 1482. Consequently, Sixtus IV, Naples, Milan, and Florence formed a league against Venice]. To keep down the pope they made use of the barons of Rome. The latter, being divided into two factions (Orsini and Colonna) had always a pretext for disorder. While they remained armed before the very eyes of the pontiff, they kept the pontificate weak and insecure. Although there might arise sometimes a courageous pope, such as Sixtus [IV], yet neither fortune nor wisdom could rid him of these annoyances. The short life of a pope is also a cause of weakness. For in the ten years, which is the average serve-time of a pope, he scarcely had time to crush one of the factions. If, so to speak, one pope had almost managed to destroy the Colonna, another came along hostile to the Orsini, restored the Colonna, and yet did not have enough time to ruin the Orsini. This was the reason why the temporal power of the pope was little respected in Italy.

After that, Alexander VI arose. He, more than any other pontiff who has ever lived, showed how much a pope could achieve with both money and armed forces. Using Duke Valentino as his instrument and the French invasion as his opportunity, he brought about all those things that I have discussed above in the actions of the duke. Although his intention was to aggrandize the duke, not the Church, nonetheless, what he did contributed to the greatness of the Church, which, after his death and the ruin of the duke, became the heir to all his labors.

Pope Julius came afterward and found the Church strong, possessing all the Romagna, with the Roman barons destroyed and, because of Alexander’s vigor, the factions wiped out. He also found ready to hand a means of accumulating wealth, which had never been practiced before Alexander. Such things Julius not only followed, but also improved upon. Moreover, he intended to gain Bologna, to ruin the Venetians, and to drive the French out of Italy. All of these enterprises prospered with him, and so much the more to his credit, inasmuch as he did everything to strengthen the Church and not any private person. He kept also the Orsini and Colonna factions within the bounds in which he found them. Although there was among them some minds disposed to make trouble, he held them in check through two things: the one -- the greatness of the Church, with which he terrified them; and the other -- not allowing them to have their own cardinals, who caused the disorders among them. For whenever these factions have their cardinals they do not remain quiet for long, because cardinals foster the factions in Rome and out of it, and the barons are compelled to support them, and thus from the ambitions of prelates arise disorders and tumults among the barons. For these reasons his Holiness Pope Leo found the papacy in an extremely strong position; and it is our hope that, his immediate predecessors having established its greatness by armed forces, he will make it still greater and more venerated by his goodness and infinite other virtues.

XII. MERCENARIES AND OTHER KINDS OF SOLDIERY

HAVING discussed in detail all the characteristics of such principalities as I proposed to discuss in the beginning and having considered in some degree the causes of their prosperity and destruction by showing the methods often used to acquire and retain them, it now remains for me to discuss in general the various ways in which these principalities can organize own means of offence and defense.

We have already seen how necessary it is for a prince to have the foundations of his state well laid; otherwise, it is bound to be destroyed. The main foundations of every state, new as well as old or composite, are good laws and good arms. There cannot be good laws where the state is not well armed; therefore, when the state is well armed, it has good laws. Consequently, I shall leave the laws out of the discussion and shall speak of the arms.

I say that the arms with which a prince defends his state are either his own, or mercenaries, or auxiliaries, or composite. Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous. If a prince bases the defense of his state on mercenaries, he will never achieve stability or security. For mercenaries are disunited, ambitious, undisciplined, and disloyal. They are valiant before friends and cowardly before enemies. They have neither the fear of God nor fidelity to men. They avoid defeat just as long as they avoid battle, for in peace -- they rob the commoners, and in war – they allow the enemy to do the same. The fact is they have no other attraction or reason for keeping the field than trickled payments of the prince, which are not sufficient to make them willing to die for him. They are ready enough to be your soldiers while you do not make war. However, if war comes, they either desert before the battle or are dispersed during of it. I should have little need to labor this point, for the present ruin of Italy has been caused by nothing else but the reliance for many years on mercenary troops. Although there had been times when some made good use of them, and they had appeared brave against other mercenaries; yet when the foreigners invaded Italy, they showed selves for what they were. A consequence was that Charles, King of France, was allowed to seize Italy with his foragers alone. He, who told us that our sins were the cause of it, told the truth. [Allusion to Savonarola.] However, they were not the sins he imagined, but those which I have described. As they were the sins of princes, they too have paid the penalty.

I want to clarify further the unhappy results that followed from the use of mercenaries, whose commanders are either capable in warfare or they are not. If they are, you cannot trust them, because they always aspire to promote their own greatness, either by coercing you, their employer, or by coercing others contrary to your intentions. However, if the commander is lacking such ability, you are ruined in the usual way.

If it be urged that whoever is armed will act in the same way, whether mercenary or not, I reply that armed forces must be under the control of either a prince or a republic -- a prince ought to assume personal command and perform the duty of commander. A republic must appoint its own citizens. When a so appointed commander turns out incompetent, the republic ought to change him; and when he is competent, it should limit his authority by a law. Experience has shown that only armed princes and armed republics achieve solid success, and mercenaries bring nothing but loss. A republic that has its own army, compiled of own citizens, is far less likely to be subjugated either by one of its own citizens or by one who leads the foreign armed forces.

Rome and Sparta stood for many ages armed and free. Every Swiss man is armed and quite free. The Carthaginians provide an example of reliance on mercenaries in ancient times. They were very nearly subjugated by their mercenary soldiers after the first war with the Romans, even though the Carthaginians had their own citizens for commanders. After the death of Epaminondas, the Thebans made Philip of Macedon commander of their soldiers, and after victory, he took away their liberty.

When Duke Filippo died, the Milanese hired Francesco Sforza to soldier for them against the Venetians. He defeated the enemy at Caravaggio, allied with them after the battle, crushed the Milanese, and became their master. His father, Sforza, having been hired by Queen Joanna of Naples, deserted her unprotected and defenseless, so that she was forced to throw self into the arms of the King of Aragon, in order to save her kingdom. I admit that the Venetians and Florentines formerly extended their dominions by these arms and yet their commanders did not make selves their princes, but have defended them. However, the Florentines happen to have been lucky. For hiring some of the able commanders, the Florentines have stood in fear. Some of them have failed to achieve military success, some have been checked in their plans, and others have turned their ambitions elsewhere. Giovanni Acuto proved to be unsuccessful, and therefore, his loyalty could not be tested. However, every one will admit that if he had been successful in a battle, the Florentines would have been in his power. The Sforzas always had the Bracceschi against them, and they held each other in check. Francesco turned his ambition to Lombardy, Braccio -- against the Church and the kingdom of Naples.

However, let us have a look at what happened a little while ago. The Florentines appointed as their commander Paolo Vitelli, a very shrewd man who, starting modestly, achieved considerable renown. Had he taken Pisa, the Florentines would undeniably have had to fall in with his desires, for if he became the soldier of their enemies they had no means of resisting and keeping him at their service meant that they had to obey him.

The Venetians, if their achievements are considered, will be seen to have acted safely and gloriously so long as they sent to war their own citizens, who displayed the greatest valor. This was before they turned to enterprises on land, but when they began to fight on land, they lost their bravery and followed the military tradition of Italy. In the beginning of their expansion on land, having little territory and great reputation, they had not much to fear from their commanders. However, when they expanded, with Carmagnola as their commander, they had a taste of this mistake. For, having found him a most valiant man when they beat the duke of Milan under his leadership, they started to perceive him as lukewarm in his military conduct. Then they realized that he would no longer conquer for them, and for that reason they were neither willing nor able to let him go, lest they lost what they had acquired. Thus, they were compelled to murder him. Afterward they had appointed as their commanders Bartolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, the count of Pitigliano, and the like, under whom they had to dread loss and not gain, as happened at Vaila, where in one battle they lost that which in eight hundred years they had acquired with so much trouble. Mercenary armies bring only slow, belated, and feeble conquests, but sudden and startling defeats.

Since these examples have brought me to Italy, which has been dominated for so many years by mercenary armies, I would like to discuss them more thoroughly, for having seen their origin and progress it would be easier to provide a remedy.

You must understand that the empire has recently come to be repudiated in Italy, that the Pope has acquired more temporal power, and that Italy has been divided up into more states, for the reason that many of the great cities took up arms against their nobles. The latter, favored by the emperor, were oppressing the commoners. However, the Church, favoring the commoners in order to increase its temporal authority, supported these revolts. In many others cities, one of the citizens became prince. From this, it happened that Italy fell almost entirely under control of the Church and some few republics. However, the Church, consisting of priests, and the republic -- of shopkeepers, both unaccustomed to arms, and thus, both commenced to hire foreigners into their military organizations.

The first reputable mercenary was Alberigo da Conio, a native of the Romagna. From the school of this man sprang, among others, Braccio and Sforza, who in their time were the masters of Italy. Then came all the other mercenaries who until now have taught the art of war in Italy. The result of their valor has been that Italy has been overrun by Charles, plundered by Louis, ravaged by Ferdinand, and insulted by the Swiss men.

The guiding principle of the mercenary commanders has been first to detract the attention of the opponent from the position of their infantry, thus, increasing the effect of its surprise attack or the chances of its survival. They did this because, subsisting on their pay and without citizenship, they were unable to support many soldiers. A few infantry did not give them any authority. Therefore, they had recourse to cavalry, and in this way, they were honored and provided for, while needing only moderate numbers, which they were able to maintain. Affairs were brought to such a pass that, in an army of twenty thousand soldiers, there would be hardly found two thousand foot soldiers. Besides this, they directed all their art to lessen fatigue and danger to themselves and their soldiers, not killing in the contest, but taking prisoners and liberating without ransom. They never attacked garrison towns by night, and it they were besieged they never made a sortie; they never surrounded their camp either with stockade or ditch, neither they campaigned in winter.

All these things were permitted by their military code, and were devised by them to avoid, as I have said, both fatigue and dangers. Thus, they have brought Italy to slavery and contempt.

XIII. AUXILIARIES, COMPOSITE, AND ONE'S OWN ARMIES

AUXILIARIES, the other useless kind of army, are employed when a weak prince calls upon another powerful prince to come with his forces to aid and defend, as was done by Pope Julius in the most recent times. For he, having poor experience with his mercenaries in the Ferrara campaign, turned to auxiliaries and stipulated with Ferdinand, King of Spain, for assistance with his men and arms. Such armies may be useful and good in selves, but for the one, who calls them in, they are almost ever disastrous; for when they lose -- one is a slave of the enemy, when they win – one is at the mercy of his own defenders.

Although ancient histories is full of examples, nevertheless, I will content with the fresh example, provided by Pope Julius II, whose actions could not be perceived as wise when, wishing to get Ferrara, he threw himself entirely into the hands of a foreigner. Nevertheless, such was his good fortune that something else happened that prevented him from reaping the fruit of his rash sawing. For, after having his auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, the Swiss men arrived on the scene and drove the victors off. Thus, to everybody’s surprise, including his own, Julius escaped being at the mercy of his enemy and being in the power of own auxiliaries.

The Florentines, being entirely without army, hired ten thousand Frenchmen to take Pisa, whereby they incurred more dangers than at any time during their troubles.

The emperor of Constantinople, to withstand his neighbors, sent ten thousand Turks into Greece, who, when the war was over, refused to leave; and this was how the infidels started to enslave Greece.

Therefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of this kind of army, for it is much more hazardous than mercenaries, because with auxiliaries your ruin is ready made. Auxiliaries are fatal to you, for they constitute a united army, wholly obedient to someone else; but mercenaries, having conquered, need more time and better opportunities to harm you, because they are not a compact community and they are gathered and paid by you. Mercenaries are also led by a commander you appoint, and he cannot immediately assume enough authority to be able to do you harm. In conclusion, the most dangerous feature of mercenaries is their cowardice, of auxiliaries -- their valor. Wise princes, therefore, have always avoided the auxiliary armies and turned to their own. They preferred to lose battles with their own armed forces rather than win them with others, not deeming that a true victory is possible with the armies of foreigners.

I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions as an example. The duke used auxiliaries invading the Romagna. He headed there only with the French soldiers, capturing Imola and Forli. Afterward, perceiving such forces as not reliable, he turned to mercenaries, discerning less danger in them. He hired the Orsini and Vitelli, using whom he found as doubtful, disloyal, and dangerous. Then he dismissed them and turned to his own men. You can easily discern the difference between those armies when the duke appeared as commanding the French auxiliaries, the duke appeared as commanding the Orsini and Vitelli mercenaries, and the duke commanded his own armed forces. He grew in stature at each stage; and he was never respected higher than when every one saw that he was absolute master of his own armed forces.

I did not want to depart from the recent Italian examples, but I do not want to leave out Hero of the Syracusans, whom I have already mentioned. When the Syracusans made him a head of their army, he soon found out that a mercenary soldiery, constituted like our Italian condottieri, was useless; and it appeared to him impossible either to keep or to disband them. Therefore, he had them all cut to pieces. Afterward, he made wars with his own, not with alien soldiers.

I would also like to recall to memory an allegory from the Old Testament that is relevant to my argument. David offered himself to Saul to fight Goliath, the Philistine champion. Saul encouraged David and gave him own weapons, which David rejected as soon as he tried them on, saying he would be unable to fight well with them, and that he wanted to meet the enemy with his sling and his knife. In short, the armor of others either drops off you or weighs you down, or is too tight.

Charles VII, the father of King Louis XI, having by good fortune and valor liberated France from the Englishmen, recognized the necessity of having own armed forces; and by an ordinance he established own cavalry and infantry. Afterward, his son, King Louis, abolished that ordinance and the infantry, and began to hire the Swiss men. This mistake, followed by others, has, as we can see now, been a source of peril to that kingdom. Having raised the reputation of the Swiss men, he has entirely demoralized the Frenchmen, for he has abolished the infantry, and his cavalry became dependant on foreign troops, because being accustomed to fight along with the Swiss men, the Frenchmen have come to believe that they alone, without foreigners, cannot win a battle. Hence, Frenchman is no match for Swiss man; therefore, without the Swiss men, they do not come off well against others. The French armies have thus become mixed, partly mercenary and partly citizen. Together they are much better than mercenaries alone or auxiliaries alone, yet they are much inferior to a citizen army. This example proves that the kingdom of France would be unconquerable if the ordinance of Charles had been maintained or developed.

However, men are so imprudent that on entering into an affair that looks well at first, they cannot discern the poison that is hidden in it, as I have said above of hectic fevers. Therefore, whoever rules a principality and cannot recognize evils the moment they appear is lacking in true wisdom. However, this ability to discern troublemakers from a first glance is given to few.

If the primary cause of the Roman Empire's disintegration should be examined, it will be found to have commenced only with the hiring of the Goths in the imperial army. From that time, the vigor of the Roman Empire began to decline; and that valor, which had raised it, passed away to others.

I conclude, therefore, that no principality is secure without having its own armed forces; rather, it is dependent on fortune, since there is no valor or loyalty to defend it when adversity comes.

Wise men have always believed that, ‘nothing is so weak or unstable as a fame or power that is not founded on one’s own forces’. One's own forces are composed either of subjects, citizens, or dependants. All others are mercenaries or auxiliaries. The way to organize one's own forces will be easily found if one studies the precedents set by the four rulers, I named above, and if one understands how Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, and many other republics and princes have armed and organized selves. I willingly defer to the wisdom of what they instituted.

XIV. ORGANIZING ONE’S OWN ARMY

A PRINCE should have no other object or thought, nor select anything else for his study, than war – its organization and discipline. For this is all that is expected of a ruler; and it is so useful that it not only upholds those who are born princes, but it often enables ordinary citizens to become rulers. On the contrary, we find that when princes have thought more of their pleasure than of arms have lost their states. The primary cause of losing your state is to neglect the art of war, and being skillful in this art enables you to acquire a state.

Francesco Sforza, knowing the martial art, from a private person became Duke of Milan; however, his sons, through avoiding the hardships and troubles of studying and prophesizing the martial art, from dukes became private persons. For among other evils of being unarmed mentally and physically -- causes you to be despised. It will be later shown that this is one of those ignominies, against which a prince should guard himself.

There is simply no comparison between the armed and unarmed men. Therefore, it is not reasonable to expect that an armed man should obey willingly to an unarmed man; or that the unarmed man should remain safe and secure among his armed servants. In the latter case, one of them is in suspicion, and the other -- in disdain, making cooperation impossible. Therefore, besides other already mentioned misfortunes that he invites, neither his soldiers would respect a prince who does not understand the art of war, nor he would rely on them.

Therefore, he should never allow his thoughts deviate from military exercises that he should pursue more vigorously in peace than in war. These exercises can be both physical (by action) and mental (by study).

As for the physical exercises, besides keeping his men well organized and trained, he should always be out hunting or camping, so accustoming his body to hardships and learning some practical geography. He should try to understand how the mountains rise, how the valleys open out, how the plains spread out, and what is the nature of rivers and marshes; and in all this, he should take the greatest care. That knowledge is useful in two ways: firstly, knowing own country, he can organize its better defense. Moreover, his knowledge of the local conditions will facilitate his study any other that it may be necessary for him to study hereafter. For example, the hills, valleys, plains, rivers, and marshes of Tuscany have a certain resemblance to those of other countries. Therefore, with the knowledge of that aspect of a country, one can easily arrive at the knowledge of others. The prince, who lacks this knowledge, also lacks the essential qualification of a good commander. For it teaches him how to locate and surprise his enemy, where to take up quarters, how to lead his army on the march and draw it up for battle, and how to lay siege to a town to the best advantage.

Philopoemen, Prince of the Achaeans, has been praises by the historians for, among other things, having never in peacetime anything in his mind but the rules of war. When he was in the countryside with friends, he often stopped for a discussion, reasoning -- ‘If the enemy should be upon that hill, and we should find ourselves here with our army, who would have the advantage? How would one engage them without breaking ranks? If we should retreat, how would we proceed? If they should retreat, how would we pursue them?’

As they went along, he expounded all the possibilities that could befall an army; he would listen to their opinion and state his, corroborating it with reasons, so that by these continual discussions there could never arise, in time of war, any unexpected circumstances that he could deal with.

As for intellectual exercise, the prince should read history, and studying the actions of eminent men, to see how they have conducted selves during war and to examine the causes of their victories and defeats, to avoid the latter and imitate the former. Above all, he should read history so that he can do what eminent man have done before him – taking as their role-model some historical figure who has been praised and honored before him, and whose achievements and deeds he always kept in his mind. For instance, Alexander the Great imitated Achilles, Caesar imitated Alexander, Scipio -- Cyrus. Whoever reads the life of Cyrus, written by Xenophon, will recognize afterward how much of the glory won by Scipio can be attributed to his imitation to Cyrus, and how much in his chastity, courtesy, humanity, and generosity, Scipio conformed to the picture, which Xenophon drew of Cyrus.

A wise prince should observe some rules – he should never be idle in peaceful times, but increase his resources with industry in such a way that they may be available to him in adversity, so that, if fortune changes, it may find him prepared to resist her blows.

XV. THE THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, ESPECIALLY PRINCES, ARE PRAISED OR BLAMED

IT remains now to see what should be the rules of conduct for a prince towards his subjects and friends. Many have written on this subject and I hope nobody will consider me as a presumptuous man, especially in discussing this subject. Although I draw up an original set of rules, my intention is to say something that will be practical and useful to the inquirer. It appears to me more as being appropriate to reflect upon things as they truly are rather than as they are imagined, for many have dreamed up about republics and principalities, which in reality have never existed. The disparity between how one lives in reality is so far distant from how one should live. Therefore, one who neglects to comprehend this difference between what is actually done and what should be done rather effects own destruction than self-preservation; for a man who wishes to act virtuously in every possible way becomes necessarily disillusioned while living among many who are not virtuous. [‘It is hard to fly eagle when you surrounded by turkeys,’ VS]

Hence, if a prince wants to maintain his rule, he must learn how to do wrong, using this knowledge in accord with its necessity. Putting aside imaginary things and referring only to those that truly exist, and because princes are more noticeable, the various qualities of a prince are often exposed and he is either blamed or praised for them. Discussing those things, which are real, I say that some men, especially princes, are considered to be either generous or miserly, benevolent or rapacious, compassionate or cruel, faithful or faithless, effeminate and cowardly or fierce and courageous, courteous or snobbish, lascivious or pure, sincere or cunning, flexible or stubborn, stern or easy-going, religious or skeptical, and so forth. I use a Tuscan term ‘miserly’ instead of ‘avaricious’ because the latter term in our language describes one who desires to possess by robbery while miserly is one who deprives self too much of the use of his own.

I know everyone will agree that it would be most praiseworthy in a prince to exhibit all those qualities that are commonly deemed good. However, because of the human reality, they can neither be entirely possessed nor observed. Therefore, it is necessary for a prince to be sufficiently prudent and know how to avoid the bad reputation that follows for the exhibition of those vices, which may cost him his state. He also must avoid those vices that are not so dangerous, but he should not worry too much about them when he could not avoid them, for his state can be saved though with some difficulty. He must not shrink from being blamed for vices that are necessary for safeguarding his state. If everything is considered carefully, he may find that some of his virtuous actions might appear to others as vices and practicing them, he would destroy own state; while acting sometimes “badly”, from the common point of view, he may secure his state and lead it to prosperity.

XVI. GENEROSITY AND STINGINESS

COMMENCING with the first of the above-mentioned characteristics, I say it would be splendid if a prince had a reputation for generosity. Nevertheless, even if he does in fact earn that reputation, he might be disappointed because, if he earned it honestly, it may pass unnoticed and it will not help him to avoid a reproach for its opposite. Therefore, anyone wishing to acquire a reputation of a generous man has to show off all his acts and thoughts. A vain-gloriously displaying prince will soon squander all his resources and afterward, wishing to upheld his reputation, will be compelled to lay excessive burdens on the people by imposing extortionate taxes and doing every bad thing to raise his revenues.

His subjects will soon hate him for that; moreover, being impoverished himself, he will be generally despised. Thus, having offended many and rewarded few, he will be vulnerable to the very first minor setback and imperiled by whatever may be the first real danger -- and all that because of his excessive passion for being deemed as a generous man. Recognizing the danger of that excess and wishing to draw back from it, he runs amuck once again into being reproach for stinginess.

Therefore, not being able to exercise the virtue of generosity in such a way that it would be recognized and appreciated, a prudent prince should not shy being called a miser. For in time, he will be recognized as being virtually a generous man while being just economical when his revenues are enough, when he can defend self against all attacks and is able to engage in enterprises without burdening his people. Thus he proves being generous to all those from whom he does not take (and they are numerous) and being miserly towards those to whom he does not give (and they are few).

In our time, only those who have been considered misers have actually done great things; the rest have failed to accomplish anything. Pope Julius II made use of a reputation for generosity while he has been fighting for the papacy, yet he has not strived afterward to keep it up, when he has wanted to be able to finance his wars. The present king of France has been able to wage numerous wars without taxing his subjects excessively, for he supplied his additional expenses out of his long thriftiness. Were the present king of Spain reputed for his generosity, he would not start so many enterprises moreover finish them victoriously.

Therefore, a prince must think little of being deemed generous when he would be called a miser. His stinginess becomes his thriftiness when he has not been robbing his subjects, when he can defend himself, when he does not become poor and despicable, when he is not forced to become rapacious. Stinginess is one of those vices that might sustain his rule.

One may object, that ‘Caesar obtained empire by generosity, and many others have reached the highest positions by having been generous men’. Granted, I would answer -- either you are already a prince or you are on your way to becoming one. In the first case, this generosity is dangerous. In the second -- it is very necessary to be considered generous. Caesar was one of those who wanted to establish his own rule over Rome. However, if he had survived after establishing it and not moderated his expenses, he would have destroyed his government.

Another may retort, that 'many have been princes who have done great things with their armies and who have been considered very generous'. I would reply -- either a prince spends what is his own or his subjects’, or else what belongs to others. In the first case, he should be thrifty; in the second -- he should not neglect any opportunity for showing his generosity. The price who campaigns with his army, living by pillage, sack, and extortion, disposes of what belongs to foreigners. In the latter case, he must be open-handed; otherwise, soldiers would not follow him. A prince can be more liberal with that property, which is neither his nor his subjects', thus earning a reputation of a ready giver, as were Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander. Such a liberality would not take away his reputation of a prudent man if he would squander the property of foreigners, because he would give it away to his own subjects who would pay him increased taxes on that property. He would hurt himself only by squandering what is his own and what is his subjects’.

There is nothing so self-destructing as liberality with own and own subjects’ property, for while you practice it you lose the ability to do so becoming either poor and despised or rapacious and hateful. A prince should guard himself, above all things, against being despised and hated; but imprudent generosity might lead him to both.

Therefore, it is wiser to have a reputation for stinginess that brings reproach without hatred, than to be forced while seeking a reputation for generosity to incur a name for rapacity that begets reproach with hatred and ignominy.

XVII. CRUELTY AND COMPASSION, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED THAN FEARED

INQUIRING into the other above-mentioned characteristics, I say that every prince should desire to have a reputation for compassion rather than for cruelty. However, he should be careful and not using his compassion excessively. Cesare Borgia was considered cruel. Notwithstanding, his cruelty reconciled the Romagna, unified it, and restored order and peace in it. If this were rightly considered, Cesare will be seen as more compassionate and merciful than the Florentines, who, avoiding a reputation for cruelty, permitted Pistoia to be destroyed. [Pistoia was a satellite-city of Florence. The Florentines forcibly restored order there when conflict broke out between two rival factions in 1501-2.]

Therefore, a prince should not worry about a reproach for cruelty so long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal. By a couple of executions, he might prove to be more compassionate than those who, being excessively compassionate, allowed disorders that led to murders or robberies. The latter nearly always harm the whole community, whereas those executions offend only a criminal who transgressed the prince’s rule.

A new prince, of all rulers, finds it impossible to avoid accusations of cruelty, because the new states are full of dangers. Hence, Virgil, through the mouth of Dido, excuses the inhumanity of her reign because of its novelty. Thus he said:
Against my will, my fate,
A throne unsettled, and an infant state,
Bid me defend my realms with all my powers,
And guard with these severities my shores.

Nevertheless, a new prince should be neither slow in acting nor he should afraid his own shadow. Instead, he should proceed in a temperate manner with prudence and humanity, so that over-confidence may not make him rash or excessive distrust may render him unbearable.

Upon this, a question arises: whether it is better to be loved than feared or feared than loved? It may be answered that a prince should wish to be both, but, because it is difficult to combine them in a person, it would be much safer for him to be feared than loved when he could not combine both.

Generalizing about men, I say that they are ungrateful and fickle, they are liars and deceivers, and they are shun danger and are greedy for profit. As long as you succeed, they are yours. They would offer you their blood, property, life and children, as was noticed above, while the need for such sacrifices is far distant, but when it approaches they would turn against you. A prince, who, relying entirely on their promises, has neglected other precautions, ensures his own ruin. Friendships that are bought with money and not with greatness or nobility of mind may indeed exist, but they do not last and they yield nothing. Men have less scruple in offending one whom they love than one whom they fear, for men brake love obligations when it is to their advantage to do so; but fear is strengthened by a dread of punishment which is always effective.

Therefore, a prince should inspire fear in such a way that, if he is not loved, at least he escapes being hated. He can endure very well being feared while he is not hated, and that will always be as long as he abstains from the property and women of his subjects and friends. However, when it is necessary for him to execute someone, he must do it for manifest cause and with proper justification, but above all things he must keep his hands off the property of others, because men sooner forget the death of their father than the loss of their patrimony. It is always possible to find pretexts for confiscating someone’s property; and a prince who has once begun to live by rapine will always find pretexts for seizing what belongs to others. However, pretexts for taking life are harder to find and they sooner lapse.

On the other hand, when a prince is campaigning with his soldiers and is in command of a large army, then, he need not worry about having a reputation for cruelty, because without such a reputation, no army was ever kept united and disciplined.

Among the admirable deeds of Hannibal, this one we should be looking at -- having led a huge army, composed of many various races of men, on foreign campaigns, there were no dissensions arose either among soldiers or against their leader, whether things were going well or badly. This arose from nothing else than his inhuman cruelty, which, with his boundless valor, made him revered and terrified by his soldiers. However, without that cruelty, his other virtues were not sufficient to produce this effect. Shortsighted writers admire his deeds for their results and condemning them for their principal cause.

That his other virtues would not have been sufficient by themselves to produce those results may be proved by the case of Scipio, a man unique in his own time and through all recorded history. His army rebelled against him in Spain. That mutiny arose from nothing but his excessive leniency, which gave his soldiers more licenses than were necessary for military discipline. Because of this, Fabius Maximus reproached Scipio in the Senate and called him a corrupter of the Roman legions. Then again, when the Locri were plundered by one of Scipio’s officers, he neither paid back their losses nor he punished his officer; and this was all because of his excessive leniency. Excusing him, someone senators argued that there were too many who knew how not to err and too few who knew how to correct the errors of others. This lenient disposition of Scipio would have spoilt in time his fame and glory, had he continued to indulge it during the late part of his command when he was under the supervision of the Senate. His fear of being dismissed, necessitated him to conceal his defective characteristic, and such self-control contributed to his glory.

Returning to the question of being feared or loved, I conclude that, because men love when they please and fear when the prince pleases, a wise prince should rely on what he controls, and not on what he cannot control. As already noted, a prince must only endeavor to avoid being hated.

XVIII. HOW PRINCES SHOULD KEEP THEIR WORD

EVERYONE admits how praiseworthy it is for a prince to keep his word while dealing with the people by integrity rather than by craft. Nevertheless, our experience has been that only those princes have achieved great things who have kept their words of little account, who have known how to trick men with their cunning, and who have overcome in the end those who followed through once giving their word.

You must understand that there are two ways of fighting: by law or by force. The first method is proper to men, the second -- to beasts. However, as the first method often proves being insufficient, there might be a necessity to resort to the beastly method. Therefore, a prince should understand how, when, and where would be appropriate to use the cruel or humane method. The ancient writers have taught princes about this subject using an allegory that described how Achilles and many other princes were sent to be schooled to the centaur Chiron, which was half beast and half man. This allegory means that a prince must know how to survive, using both of his natures, for they would not work well one without the other.

Therefore, a prince is compelled to adopt the beastly way of life and must learn from the fox and the lion, because the lion is defenseless against traps and the fox is defenseless against wolves. Therefore, a prince must be a fox (in order to discover and escape an entrapment) and a lion (to intimidate the wolves). Those who simply act like lions are stupid and soon will perish.

Therefore, a prudent ruler could not and should not keep his word when such observance might be turned to his disadvantage and when the reasons that caused him to give that word exist no longer. If all men were good, this precept would not stand. However, because men are wretched creatures who would not keep their word to you, you too are not bound to observe your word to them. No prince ever lacked the legitimate reasons to excuse his non-observance. Consequently, endless modern examples could be given, showing how many treaties and promises have been made null and void through the non-observance of princes. Those who have known best how to employ the foxy methods have succeeded best.

A prince must know well how to cover up his actions and to be a great pretender and dissembler. Men are so simple, and so subject to present necessities, that the deceiver will always find someone ready to be deceived.

One recent example I do not want to omit. Alexander VI never did or thought of anything else but deceiving men; and he always found dupes ready for his deceptions. There never was a man who had greater power to convince people in something by swearing to the truth of it yet observing his oath less. Nonetheless, his deceits always succeeded according to his intentions, because he understood too well the credulity of mankind and was a masquerade master.

Therefore, it is not necessary for a prince to have only the good qualities I have enumerated, but he should definitely appear to have them. Moreover, I dare to say that having and always observing them would be harmful to him, for only the appearance of propriety is useful. Therefore, he should appear compassionate and merciful, faithful to his word, kind and upright. However, while doing so in the usual circumstances, he should also be able and know how to change to the opposite in the unusual ones.

You have to understand that a prince, especially a new one, cannot observe all those things for which men called him virtuous; because, in order to maintain his state, he is often forced to defy good faith, compassion, humanity, or religion. Therefore, he should keep his mind ready to turn self accordingly as the winds of fortune force him to do, yet, as I have said above, not to diverge from doing good if that is possible, but to know how to do evil if that is necessary.

For this reason, a prince should be very careful not to say anything that would damage his image and that he may appear to the public as merciful, faithful, humane, upright, and religious. There is nothing more important for the image-creation as to appear to have the last characteristic. The majority of men judge you by their eyes rather than by other organs, because the majority is in a position to see you, but not to hear or to touch you. Everyone sees what you appear to be, few experience what you really are; and those few dare not deny the opinion of the many, who are backed by the majesty of the state. Therefore, you should judge about a character of a man, and especially of a prince who have no a court of appeal, by the result of his actions.

For that reason, let a prince have the credit of conquering and maintaining his state; his methods will always be considered as honest, and the majority will always praise him. The commoners are always impressed by appearances and results, by what a thing seems to be and what comes of it. In these matters, the minority has no ground to rest on among the majority, by whom the state is supported.

A certain contemporary prince [an allusion to the king of Spain, VS], whom it is better not to name, never preaches anything else but peace and good faith, and he is most hostile to both. If he would do as he has said, he would have lost either his reputation or kingdom many times over.

XIX. AVOIDING BEING DESPISED AND HATED

HAVING already spoken about the more important above-mentioned characteristics, I wish to discuss briefly the others, less important. The prince should, as has been in part said before, avoid anything that would make him hated or despised. So long as he does so, he would have done what he should; and he would run no risk to lose his state if he is reproached only for the vices I mentioned.

A prince would be hated above all things for being, as I have said, rapacious and aggressive towards the property and women of his subjects. From both of these he must abstain. As long as he does not abuse the great majority of their property or honor, they remain content. He has only to contend with the ambition of a few, whom he can curb with ease in many ways.

He would be despised if he is considered being fickle, frivolous, effeminate, mean-spirited, irresolute, all of which a prince should avoid like a plague. Instead, he should endeavor to demonstrate in his actions greatness, courage, gravity, and strength. When settling disputes between his subjects, he should ensure that his judgments are irrevocable. He also should maintain own reputation that no one could ever dream of either deceiving or getting around him.

That prince is highly respected who succeeds in creating own positive image. Conspiracy and open attack would be difficult against a prince who is well known as a great man and revered by his people. However, a prince should fear two things, one from within, as a discord with his subjects, the other from without, as an aggression of external powers. His defense against the external aggression lies in arming himself well and having good allies. If he would be well armed, he would have good friends. Moreover, his internal affairs would always remain under control until his external affairs remain under control and indeed were not disturbed by the internal conspiracy. Even if there is disturbance abroad, but he has ordered his government and has lived as I have said, unless he is in despair, he will resist every attack, just as Nabis the Spartan did.

However, concerning his subjects’ conspiracy when affairs outside are not disturbed, he should fear only a secret conspiracy, against which a prince can adequately secure self by avoiding being hated and despised and by keeping the people satisfied – this is crucial, as I said above at length. One of the most effective remedies against conspiracies is to avoid being hated and despised by the people. For the conspirator always expects to please the people by killing the prince. However, if the conspirator would only expect to offend the people, he would not have the courage to take such a course, for the conspiracy path goes through infinite difficulties. As experience shows, there have been many conspiracies, but few have been successful, because the conspirator needs others to help him, whom he believes to be malcontents. However, as soon as the conspirator opens own mind to a malcontent, the latter gets the means of own satisfaction, for by denouncing the former the malcontent can hope to get all he wants. Seeing the sure gain from informing the ruler and the doubtful alternative, the malcontent must be a very rare friend indeed or else a mortal enemy of the prince.

Summarizing, I say that, on the side of the conspirator, there is nothing but fear, jealousy, and the terrifying prospect of punishment; on the side of the prince, there is the majesty of the state and its laws, the protection of friends and the state to defend him. Add to all these things the goodwill of commoners, and it is improbable that any one should be so rash as to conspire. For whereas in the open rebellion the conspirator has usually to fear before he acts, in the case of the secret conspiracy he has also to fear after his act, because the people are hostile to him.

Countless examples could be given on this subject, but I will be content with one that happened within the memory of our fathers. The Canneschi had conspired against and killed Messer Annibale Bentivoglio, grandfather of the present Annibale and prince of Bologna. Not one of his family survived but Messer Giovanni, who was in childhood. Immediately after this assassination, the people rose and killed all the Canneschi. The people venerated the house of Bentivoglio in those days. This act of the people’s will was so great that, although no member of the family left in Bologna to lead its government, the Bolognese, having information that one of the Bentivoglio family, though the son of a blacksmith, had been living in Florence, went there to find him. They entrusted him the leadership of their government, and he ruled the city until Giovanni became old enough to head the government himself.

Therefore, I conclude that when a prince has the support of the majority, he should reckon conspiracies of little importance. However, when the people are hostile to him and hate him, he should fear everything and everybody. Well-organized states and wise princes have always taken every possible care to satisfy the people and not to despair the nobles. For this is one of the most important tasks, a prince must resolve.

France is among the best-organized kingdoms of our times, and it has many good institutions on which the king’s freedom of action and security depend. The first of these institutions is the parliament and its authority. The founder of the French state, knowing the ambition and arrogance of the nobility, decided that a bit in their mouths would be necessary to hold them in order. On the other hand, he wanted to reassure and protect the people, knowing how they feared and hated the nobles. Yet, he did not want that the protection of the people became a particular responsibility of the king, wishing to save him from being reproached by the nobles for favoring the people and from the people for favoring the nobles. Therefore, he set up an arbiter to beat down the nobles and favor the people without bringing reproach on the king. Neither could you have better and prudent institutions nor a more effective arrangement of security to the king and kingdom.

From this, a prince can draw another important conclusion -- that he should delegate the management of the reproachable and unpopular programs to his ministers while keeping in own hands the praiseworthy and popular ones. Moreover, he should cherish the nobles but not at the expense of being hated by the people.

Perhaps some of those who have studied the lives and deaths of the Roman emperors, may believe that those examples contradict to my opinion. Although some emperors lived nobly and showed strong character, they have lost their empires or have been killed by subjects who have conspired against them. Wanting to answer these objections, I will discuss the characters of some of the emperors, and will show that the causes of their ruin had not been different from those I have enumerated. At the same time, I will submit for consideration only those examples that are well known to those who study the affairs of those times. It seems to me sufficient to take all those emperors, who reined that empire, starting from Marcus the philosopher and down to Maximinus; that is, Marcus Aurelius and his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus and his son Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus.

Firstly, whereas other princes have contended only with the ambition of the nobles and the insolence of the people, the Roman emperors had a third difficulty -- while dealing with the cruelty and avarice of their soldiers. This task was so beset with difficulties that it was responsible for the downfall of many, because it had a hardly satisfactorily result for both the soldiers and the people. The peace-loving people wanted the non-adventurous ruler, while the soldiers wanted the warlike prince who was arrogant, cruel, and rapacious. The soldiers were quite willing that he would exercise such his qualities upon the people, in order that they could get double pay and give vent to their avarice and cruelty. Hence, those emperors, who had no great authority either by birth or training to hold both the soldiers and the people in check, were always overthrown. Most of them, especially those who were novices to the governmental organization, recognizing the difficulty of these two diverse classes, were inclined to appease the soldiers, caring little about injuring the people.

This policy was necessary, because princes cannot help being hated by some classes. Therefore, firstly, they should avoid being hated by every class; and if they could not accomplish this, they should endeavor with the utmost diligence to avoid the hatred of the most powerful class.

Therefore, those emperors, who through inexperience had need of special favor, adhered readily to the soldiers rather than to the people. That policy would turn out advantageous to those of them who knew how to maintain authority over their soldiers.

From these causes, it happened that Marcus Aurelius, Pertinax, and Alexander, being men of modest life, lovers of justice, enemies to cruelty, kind and courteous, all, except Marcus, came to a sad end. Marcus alone lived and died honored, because he had succeeded to the throne by hereditary right, and owed nothing either to the soldiers or the people. Possessing many characteristics that earned him a great respect, all his life he succeeded in keeping both these classes in check while being neither hated nor despised.

On the other hand, Pertinax was created emperor against the will of the soldiers, who, being accustomed to live licentiously under Commodus, could not tolerate the decency, which Pertinax wished to impose on them. Adding to the soup of hatred their contempt for his old age, the soldiers overthrew his administration at its early stages.

It should be noted that one could be hated just as well for good works as for bad ones. Therefore, as I said before, a prince wishing to maintain his administration is often forced to do bad things. For whenever he wishes to satisfy that class of men (either the people or the soldiers, or the nobles), on which he believes his rule depends most, and that class is corrupt, then his good works become his enemies.

However, let us come to Alexander, among whose multiple good qualities was one he was credited for, that he was a man of such goodness that during the fourteen years he reined the empire no one was ever put to death without trial. Nevertheless, being considered effeminate and a man who allowed to be ruled by own mother, he became despised; consequently, the soldiers conspired against him and murdered him.

In contrast, looking at the characters of Commodus, Severus, Caracalla, and Maximinus, you would find them all as cruel and rapacious men. To satisfy the soldiers, they did not hesitate to inflict every kind of injury to the people. Consequently, all of them had an unhappy end, except Severus, who was a man of such valor that, keeping the soldiers friendly while the people were oppressed, he reigned successfully to the end. For his valor so impressed the soldiers and people that the latter were continuously kept astonished and awed and the former -- respectful and satisfied. And because the actions of Severus, were outstanding for a new ruler, I wish to show briefly that he knew well how to behave like both the fox and the lion, which natures, as I said above, are necessary for a prince to imitate.

Knowing the laziness of the emperor Julian, Severus persuaded the army that he commanded in Slavonia, that it would be right to march on Rome to avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been killed by the praetorian soldiers. Under this pretext, without any sign of being aspired to the throne, his army marched on Rome and reached Italy before it was known that he had moved. On his arrival at Rome, the Senate, out of fear, killed Julian and elected him emperor. After this successful start, there remained two obstacles in Severus’ way of becoming a master of the whole empire: one was in Asia, where Niger, commander of the Asiatic army, had had to be already proclaimed emperor; the other was in the west, where Albinus, heading his army, also aspired to the throne. Considering as dangerous to declare himself hostile to both, Severus decided to attack Niger and to deceive Albinus. Writing to the latter, that being elected emperor by the Senate, he would like to share that dignity with Albinus. Severus also sent Albinus the title of Caesar and, by a resolution of the Senate, had made him co-emperor. Albinus took all these things at their face value.

However, after Severus had defeated and killed Niger, settled oriental affairs, and returned to Rome, he started to complain to the Senate that Albinus had not been recognizing the benefits from him. Alleging that Albinus was ungrateful and, by treachery, had sought to murder him, Severus declared Albinus the enemy of the state. Afterward he marched on Albinus in France, and took from him his state and life.

Therefore, whoever examines carefully the actions of this man would find him a most valiant lion and a most cunning fox; and that he was feared and respected by everyone but not hated by the army. You need not wonder at Severus’ upstart, because he proved self as able to maintain his sovereignty. Thereafter, his renown always protected him from that hatred which the people might have conceived against him for his violence and plunder.

Caracalla, Severus’ son, was also a man of prominent character. For his excellent qualities, he was accepted by the people and admired by the soldiers. The latter respected him for being the most enduring of fatigue and a despiser of all effeminate things -- delicacies and other luxuries.

Nevertheless, his ferocity and cruelties were so great and so inhumane that, after a large number of murders of the people of Rome and all those of Alexandria, the great majority hated him. Even the members of his inner circle started to fear him to such a degree that he was murdered amid his army by a centurion [a commander of a hundred of soldiers, VS].

It should be noted that princes could not avoid death like that one if a fanatic or a resolved and desperate man makes the attempt of assassination, because anyone who does not fear to die self can inflict it to others. On the other hand, a prince should fear less such assassinations because they were very rare. However, he has to be careful not to inflict any grave injury to his closest officers. Caracalla had not taken this precaution, but had disgraced and killed a brother of that centurion, whom he also threatened daily, yet retained him as own bodyguard. Such edgy behavior, as it turned out, was miscalculated and proved fatal for this emperor.

However, let us look at the life of Commodus, to whom reining the empire was very easy, for he inherited it as the son of Marcus. He had only to follow example of his father to satisfy the soldiers and the people. However, being cruel and brutal but lazy, he went along with the soldiers thus indulging and corrupting them, so that he was necessitated to be rapacious toward the people. Moreover, he neglected to maintain the dignity of his office often descending to the amphitheatres to compete with gladiators and doing other ignoble things that were not worthy of the imperial majesty. Consequently, the soldiers became contemptuous toward him. Thus, being hated by the people and despised by the soldiers, he was conspired against and killed.

It remains to discuss the character of Maximinus. He was a very militaristic, and the armies, being disgusted with the effeminacy of Alexander, whom I have already mentioned, killed him and elected Maximinus to the throne, on which he had not sat for long. For two things made him hated and despised: first, he was of the lowest origins and once a shepherd in Thrace -- this fact was well known to all and considered a great indignity by everyone. Second, at his accession, he neglected to go to Rome to be formally hailed as emperor, and he had gained a reputation for extreme savagery by inflicting many cruelties through his prefects in Rome and elsewhere in the empire. Thereafter, angered at the meanness of his birth and fearing his barbarity, the great majority of the people rebelled against his rule. First Africa rebelled, then the Senate with the backing all the people of Rome. All Italy conspired against him. Even his own army conspired against him and, while besieging Aquileia and meeting with difficulties in taking it, disgusted with his cruelties and fearing him less when they found so many against him, the soldiers murdered him.

I do not wish to discuss Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julian, who, being strongly despised, were quickly eliminated. Instead, I will conclude by saying that contemporary princes have less difficulty in solving this problem, because they take extraordinary measures to satisfy their soldiers. Although they do have to consider the problem, none of them have standing armies that are firmly established in the government and administration of provinces, as were the armies of the Roman Empire. It was necessary in Roman times to satisfy the demands of the soldiers rather than those of the people, because the former had more power than the latter. In our times, it is more necessary to all princes (except the Turk and the Sultan) rather to satisfy the people than the soldiers, because the people are the more powerful.

I have excluded the Turk, because he maintains a standing army of twelve thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry on which depend the security and strength of his kingdom; therefore, he must put aside other considerations that would benefit the people in order to retain the loyalty of the soldiers. Similarly, the kingdom of the Sultan is entirely in the hands of soldiers, and he must neglect the interests of the people while securing the allegiance of his soldiers.

You should note that the state of the Sultan is unlike all other principalities, for being like the papacy, which cannot be called either a hereditary or a newly formed principality. The sons of the old prince are not the heirs to the thrown and remain only the nobles, while the new prince elected by the nobles who have authority to do so. Being an ancient system, it cannot be called a new principality, because there are none of the difficulties encountered in a new principality. Although the prince is new, the institutions of the state are old, and they are framed to adopt him as if he were the hereditary ruler.

Returning to our subject, I say that whoever follows my argument will acknowledge that either hatred or contempt has been fatal to the above-named emperors. He will also recognize how it happened that, some of them acting in one way and some in another, and only one in each way came to a happy end and the rest -- to an unhappy one. Because they were new princes, it was useless and disastrous for Pertinax and Alexander to imitate Marcus, who was heir to the principality. Likewise, it was fatal to Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to imitated Severus, for they lacked valor to follow his example. Therefore, neither a new prince in a new principality can imitate the actions of Marcus no he is bound to follow those of Severus. Rather he should adopt those Severus’ characteristics, which are necessary for founding his state, and those Marcus’ characteristics, which are appropriate for maintaining his state after it has been stabilized and secured.

XX. ARE FORTRESSES AND MANY OTHER THINGS, TO WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT, USEFUL OR NOT?

TO HOLD securely their states, some princes have disarmed their subjects; others have kept their subject towns divided by factions. Some princes have fostered enmities against selves; others have endeavored to gain over those whom they distrusted in the beginning of their rule. Some princes have built fortresses; others have razed them to the ground. I cannot give a final judgment on any of these policies unless I have the particulars of those states in which a decision has to be made. Nevertheless, I will discuss the matter as comprehensively as generalities will allow.

No a new prince has ever disarmed his subjects; rather when he has found them disarmed he has always armed them, because, by arming them, he has armed himself. Those men, whom he has suspected in disloyalty at the beginning of his rule, have become loyal afterward; and those men, who have always been loyal to him, have become his zealous supporters. Yet it is impossible to arm everybody, for when a prince has given this privilege to those whom he trusts, he can deal more severely with the others. This discrimination of the people by the new prince, the former usually support, because they understand it is necessary that those whom he armed have the most obligations and dangers, therefore, their service should have the most rewards. Those men, whom he does not arm, become his dependants. When he disarms them, he at once offend them by showing that he distrusts them, either for their cowardice or just suspecting their disloyalty; in either case, he breeds their hatred.

Because a prince cannot stay in power unarmed, he is necessitated to hire mercenaries, whose character was already described. Even if they were reliable, they would not be sufficient to defend him against his powerful enemies and distrusted subjects. Therefore, as I have said, a new prince in a new principality has always arms his subjects; and history is full of examples of this.

However, when a prince conquers a new state, which he adds as a province to his old one, then, it is necessary to disarm the new subjects, except those who have been his zealous adherents in acquiring it. Moreover, even they, as time and opportunity allow, should be rendered soft and effeminate; and matters should be managed in such a way that only the armed men in his old province would be his soldiers.

Our ancestors, and those who were considered wise, were accustomed to say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by the means of factions and Pisa by the means of fortresses. Having that idea in mind, they fostered quarrels in some of their tributary towns to keep more easily them under control. This might have been well enough in those times when Italy was stable, sort of. However, I do not believe that it would be a good rule in present times, because I do not believe that factions can ever be useful to a prince of an old state. In fact, when the enemy would come upon his so divided cities, they would be inevitably succumb; because the weakest party would always assist to the invader and the other would not be able to resist.

I believe, that the Venetians, influenced the above-mentioned reason, fostered the Guelph and Ghibelline factions in their tributary cities. Although they never allowed bloodshed, they fostered the disputes among the citizens of those tributary cities in such a manner that they would be distracted by own discriminations and would not unite against the central government. That policy, as we have already seen, proved to be wrong, because, after the Venetians were routed at Vaila, one party rendered courageous and seized the state at once. Therefore, such policy is arguable, for it weakens the prince of a stable state, where such policy should never be permitted. Such policy is useful for the prince only in times of peace, when he can handle his subjects more easily by using that policy; but when war comes, the weakness of that policy is revealed.

No doubt that the greatness of a prince becomes apparent when he overcomes all obstacles and opposition. The prince’s fortune, especially when she desires to elevate a new prince who has more need to earn renown than a hereditary ruler, finds and encourages his enemies to take arms against him in order that he may have the opportunity of triumphing over them and reach a higher step on the ladder his enemies have provided. For that reason, many sages believe that when an able prince has the opportunity, he should craftily foster some opposition to himself; so that, having crushed it, he might increase own authority.

A prince, especially a new one, finds more loyalty and usefulness among those men whom he suspected in disloyalty at the beginning of his rule than among those who were his friends from the beginning. Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, ruled his state more easily through those whom he had distrusted than through others. However, further generalization on this matter would be impossible, for circumstances vary. I will say only this, a prince will never have any difficulty in pulling on own side those men who at the commencement of his princedom have been hostile to him if they are such ones who themselves need his support. They would serve to the prince loyally inasmuch as they realized the necessity to wipe out his bad impression about their previous deeds against him. Therefore, the prince may find them more useful than those who feel self so secure, serving him so long and well that they may neglect his present interests.

Since it is relevant to the subject of our discussion, I should remind that prince, who has recently come to power by encouraging dissent to the previous ruler, that he should thoroughly reflect upon the reasons that have induced those to favor him in the past. If those reasons have not been based on a natural affection toward him but rather on discontent with the old regime, then he would have them friendly only with considerable difficulty and having many troubles through them, for he would be unable to satisfy them. The prince should weigh carefully the reasons for this while sifting through ancient and modern affairs. Then he may find that it is easier for him to make friends of those men who had been satisfied under the former government and so have been his enemies, while he have been conquering the state, than of those who, being dissatisfied with the old regime, had favored him and encouraged him to seize the power.

In order to hold their states more securely, princes have been accustomed to build fortresses that may serve as a bridle and bit to those who might plot against him, and as a safe refuge from a sudden attack. I praise this policy because it has been used from the ancient times. However, in our times, Messer Niccolo Vitelli saw it fit to raze two fortresses in Citta di Castello so that he might retain that state. Guidubaldo, Duke of Urbino, returning to his dominion whence he had been driven by Cesare Borgia, razed to the ground all the fortresses in that province, considering that without them it would be more difficult to him to lose his state again. Returning to Bologna, the Bentivogli followed a similar policy.

Therefore, fortresses are useful or not depending on circumstances. They may be beneficial in one way and harmful in another. The solution of the problem can be put in this way: the prince, who is more afraid own people than of foreign invaders, must build fortresses. However, he who is more afraid foreign invaders than his own people should spare his energy for something else.

The castle of Milan, built by Francesco Sforza, has caused and will cause more trouble for the dynasty of Sforza than any other source of disorder in that state. For this reason, the best possible fortress would be in avoiding being hated by the people, because you may have the fortresses, yet they will not save you if the people hate you, for once the people have taken arms against you they will never lack the foreign assistance.

In our times, no one has seen that such fortresses have been useful to any prince, except to the countess of Forli, after consort, the count Girolamo, had been killed. She was able to withstand the attack of the people, to wait for assistance from Milan, and then to recover her state while finding refuge in her fortress. The circumstances of that time were such that the foreigners could not assist promptly to the people. Since then, fortresses were of little value even to her, when Cesare Borgia attacked her and when her hostile subjects allied with the foreign invaders. Therefore, it would have been safer for her, both then and before, not to be hated by the people than to have had fortresses. All these things considered, I would praise those princes who build fortresses as well as those who do not, but I will blame those, who put all their trust in fortresses and care little about being hated by the people.

XXI. HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF TO GAIN AUTHORITY

NOTHING increases a prince more prestige than great campaigns and striking demonstrations of his abilities. In our time, we have Ferdinand of Aragon, the present king of Spain. He can be classify as a new prince, because from being an insignificant king he has risen to fame and glory and become the foremost king in Christendom. If you examine his deeds, you will find them all great and some of them extraordinary. In the beginning of his reign, he attacked Granada, and this campaign laid the foundation of his power. He did this quietly at first and without any fear of hindrance, for he managed to channel the minds of the barons of Castile in the problems of the war and not anticipating any innovations at home. In this way, without their realizing what was happening, he increased own prestige and control over them. He was able to sustain his armies with the money of the Church and of the people, and during that prolonged war to lay a good foundation for his standing army, which has made him famous.

Furthermore, always using religion as a plea, in order to undertake even greater campaigns, he devoted himself with a pious cruelty to driving out and clearing his kingdom of the Moors. There neither could nor have been a more admirable enterprise. Under the same cloak of religion, he assailed Africa, then he came down on Italy, and recently he has attacked France. Thus, he has always planned and completed great projects that have kept the minds of his subjects in suspense and wonder about what would be their outcome. His moves have followed closely upon one another in such a way that he has never given time and opportunity to plot against self.

Once more, it is very useful for a prince to demonstrate his bright abilities in resolving internal affairs, similar to those, which are attributed to Messer Bernabo da Milano. The latter has considered that, if someone accomplishes something extraordinary in civil life, either good or bad, he should be rewarded or punished in a way that would be much spoken about. Above all things, in each his action, a prince should always endeavor to gain the reputation of being a great man of remarkable abilities.

A prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a downright enemy, that is to say, for revealing himself without any reservation in favor of one party against the other. This policy will always be more advantageous than neutrality, because if two of your powerful neighbors come to blows, they are of such a character that, if one of them conquers, you have either to fear him or not. In either case, it will always be more advantageous for you to reveal your preference and to wage a vigorous war. In the first case, if you do not declare your preference, you would invariably fall a prey to the conqueror, to the pleasure and satisfaction of the one who has been conquered, and you would have neither reasons to offer nor any way to obtain protection or refuge. The one who conquers does not want doubtful friends who would not aid him in the time of trial. The one who loses would not harbor you because you were unwilling to go and court his fate with a sword in your hand.

The Aetolians invited Antiochus into Greece to drive out the Romans. He sent envoys to the Achaeans, who were friends of the Romans, encouraging them to remain neutral. The Romans, in their turn, were urging the Achaeans to fight with them. This question came to be debated in the council of the Achaeans, where the ambassador of Antiochus persuaded them to stand neutral. To this the Roman ambassador answered: " Nothing is more contrary to your interests than their admonition that you should not interfere in this war; following their advice, you will become the prize of the victor, without favor or dignity”.

It is always the case that the one who is not your friend will request your neutrality, while the other who is your friend will demand your armed support. Avoiding immediate danger, irresolute princes follow the neutral path and usually are ruined. But when you declared boldly your support for one side, and if then that side has conquered, even though the victor is powerful and you are at his mercy, yet he is indebted to you and he has committed to a friendly bond with you. Men are never so shameless as to become an epitome of ingratitude. Victories after all are never so complete that the victor would have no scruples, especially toward justice. On the other hand, if your ally is defeated, he may shelter you, and he may help you while he can, and you become companions whose joint fortunes may well change for the better.

In the second case, when the combatants are of such power that you have no fear of whoever may be the victor, there is even more reason to choose a side. In this way, you assist the victor who, if he had been wise, would have saved the loser; because you both are victors, but your victorious ally remains at your discretion, for without your help he would not win.

It is to be noted that a prince should never join in an aggressive alliance with someone more powerful than himself, unless necessity compels him, as was said earlier; because if he conquers you are at his discretion, and princes should do their utmost to avoid being at the discretion of anyone. The Venetians joined with France against the duke of Milan, but they could have avoided that alliance, which caused their ruin. However, when such alliance cannot be avoided, as was the case with the Florentines when the pope and Spain sent armies to attack Lombardy, then the prince should support one of the parties, for the reasons given above.

No prince should ever imagine that he could always choose a safe policy; rather he should regard all possible courses of action as risky, because this is the way things are -- whenever he tries to avoid one danger, he runs into another. However, prudence consists in knowing how to assess the nature of a particular threat and in choosing the lesser evil.

A prince should also show his regard for the talent of others and to honor proficiency and excellency in every art. At the same time, he should encourage his citizens to practice their businesses peaceably, in commerce and agriculture, and in every other occupation. A man should not be afraid of improving his possessions, lest they be taken away from him; or another should not be deterred by high taxes from starting a new business. Rather the prince should offer rewards to whoever endeavors to increase the prosperity of his city or state.

Furthermore, the prince should entertain the people with festivals and spectacles at appropriate seasons of the year. As every city is divided into guilds or communities, he should regard such public organizations and associate with them sometimes, giving an example of courtesy and generosity while always maintaining the dignity of his office, for he should never do anything that would let it down.

XXII. THE MINISTERS OF PRINCES

THE CHOICE of ministers is of no little importance to a prince, and their worth depends on the prudence of the prince himself. The first opinion that is formed of a ruler’s intellect and abilities is by observing the men he has around him; and when they are competent and loyal, he may always be considered wise, because he has been able to recognize their abilities and to keep them faithful. However, when they are otherwise, the prince is always under the fire of criticism, for his prime error has been in choosing his associates.

No one of those who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as a clever man and the minister of Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, could but conclude that the latter was an able man himself. Because there are three kinds of intellects: one kind comprehends things by itself; the other appreciates what others can comprehend; and the third comprehends neither by itself nor through others. The first kind is excellent, the second is good, and the third is useless. Therefore, it follows necessarily that, if the prince of Siena did not have the first kind of intellect, at least he had the second.

Whenever a prince has a desire to know good or bad in what his associate said or done, even though he himself has no acumen, yet he can recognize the good and the bad in his associate’s actions and to praise or correct them accordingly. In this way, the associate cannot hope to deceive him and therefore takes precaution not to do wrong.

In order to assess the action of his associate, a prince can use a following infallible guide: when you see a minister thinking more of his own interests than of yours and seeking his own profit in everything he does, such a man will never be a good minister, and you will not be able to trust him. For a man, whom you entrusted your state, should never think about self but always about you and should never pay any attention to matters in which you are not concerned.

To keep your minister honest, you should be studying him, honoring him, enriching him, kind to him, sharing with him the honors and responsibilities. Thus, the minister will see how he depends on you; and having satisfied his hunger in money and honors to the point of saturation, he will desire no more and fearing only changes.

Therefore, if a relationship between a prince and his minister is of this kind, they both are confident in each other; but if it is otherwise, the result is always disastrous for either one or the other.

XXIII. AVOIDING FLATTERERS

I DO NOT want to leave out an important subject, for it has a hidden danger that princes can have difficulty to deal with, unless they are very prudent and discriminating in the choice of their ministers. I am referring to flatterers, who swarm in the courts, because men are so self-absorb in their affairs and indulged in such self-deception that they have many difficulties in avoiding this pest. However, when you do avoid the flatterers, you risk becoming despised, for there is no other way of guarding self from flatterers except letting men understand that you are not offended by their truth; but when everyone may tell you the truth, then your authority is diminished.

Therefore a wise prince should choose the mid-way in his choice of own ministers by allowing only them to speak freely to him only that truth, which concerns only those matters he asks their opinion about, and nothing else. However, he should question them thoroughly, listen to what they say, and afterward form his own conclusions. The prince’s attitude toward his councilors and advisers should be in such a way that they could recognize that the more they will speak freely the more they will be favored. When a policy, which is needed in solving a problem, has been worked out, the prince should listen to no one and be steadfast in his pursuing that policy. He, who does otherwise, either will be destroyed by flatterers or will change his opinions constantly because of conflicting advice and thus becoming despised.

I would like to illustrate this subject by an example of our times. Bishop Luca, the man of affairs to Maximilian, the present emperor, said of his majesty: “He consulted with no one, yet never got his own way in anything”. This happened because the emperor did the opposite of what should be done. The emperor is a secretive man -- neither he tells to anyone his plans nor he receives opinions on them. However, carrying them into effect, those plans become revealed and known. Consequently, they are obstructed by those unprepared men whom he has around him. Thus, his plans, being easily influenced, are diverted from their goal. Hence, whatever he does one day is undone the next, no one ever understands what his intentions are, and no one can rely on his resolutions.

Therefore, a prince should always seek advice, but only when he wishes and not when others wish. Rather he should discourage everyone from offering advice about anything unless he asks it. As I already mentioned, he should be a constant inquirer and a patient listener of the inquired things; and if he learns that anyone, for any reason, has not told him the whole truth, he should vent his anger onto that deceiver.

Many people believe that a prince, who conveys an impression of his wisdom, does so not because he has own ability, but because he has the good counselors. This is certainly not so. Here is an infallible rule – a prince who is not himself wise cannot be well advised, unless by chance he has yielded his affairs entirely to one person who happens to be a very savvy man. Indeed, in this case, he may be well governed. However, it would not be for long, because such a governor would soon deprive him of his state.

However, if a prince who is not wise should take counsel from more than one he would neither get unanimity in his councils nor be able to reconcile their views. Each of the counselors would consult his own interests, and the prince would not know how to correct or understand them. Things cannot be otherwise, for men always do badly by you, unless they are forced to be altruistic.

Therefore, it must be inferred that good counsels, whoever they come, depends on the wisdom of the prince who seeks it and not the wisdom of the prince on the good counselors.

XXIV. WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES

IF the previous suggestions are observed carefully, a new prince will appear to have been long established and will soon render himself more secure and rooted in the state than if he had been ruling his state for a long time. For the actions of a new prince attract much more attention than those of a hereditary one. When these actions are marked by his abilities, they attract more men and bind them far tighter with the new prince than ancient blood would do for a hereditary prince. For men are attracted more by the present than by the past, and when they find the present good, they enjoy it and seek no further. Indeed, in this case, they would do their utmost to defend their prince, of course, if he is not deficient in other things. Thus, the new prince would have a doubled glory -- in having established a new state and in having adorned and strengthened his new state with good laws, sound defenses, reliable allies, and inspiring leadership. On the contrary, the hereditary prince would have a doubled disgrace – in loosing his state and in being incompetent.

Let us consider those Italian princes, such as the king of Naples, the duke of Milan, and others, who have lost their states in our times. Firstly, they all had a common defect of their military organization, for the causes that have been discussed already. [Reference to the mercenaries, VS.] Moreover, some of those princes have had either the people hostile or have not known how to keep the nobles loyal even though having the people satisfied. In the absence of these defects, states that are robust enough to keep an army in the field cannot be lost.

Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander the Great but one who was conquered by Titus Quintius, ruled a small state in comparison with the greatness of the Romans who attacked him with Greek auxiliaries. Yet being a military man who knew how to satisfy the people and keep the allegiance of the nobles, he sustained the war against the Romans for many years. Although, in the end, he lost control over some cities, he retained the kingdom.

Therefore, these Italian princes may not blame fortune for the loss of their principalities after so many years of possession, but rather their own sloth. Because, in quiet times, they never thought there could be a change (it is a common defect in men, not to anticipate a storm when the sea is calm) and, when afterward the bad times came, they thought of flight and not of defending themselves. They hoped that the people, disgusted with the sloth of the conquerors, would recall them. This policy, when others fail, may be good; but it is very bad to have neglected all other precautions in that hope, since we do not find men falling down just because they expect to find someone helping them up. It may not happen; and even if it does happened, it leaves them insecure, for their policy was cowardly and not based on own actions. The only reliable and enduring defensive policy is based on own actions and valor.

XXV. HOW STRONGLY FORTUNE CONTROLS HUMAN AFFAIRS, AND HOW TO INFLUENCE HER

I AM aware that many men have held and still hold the opinion that the affairs of the world are controlled by Fortune and by God in such a way that the prudence of men cannot modify them and that men have no influence on them whatsoever. Because of this, they would conclude that there is no point to labor much in affairs, but to let chance govern them. This opinion has been more credited in our times, because of the great changes in affairs, which we have experienced and experience every day, beyond human imagining. Sometimes pondering over this, I am inclined in some degree to their opinion. Nevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, I believe that is probably true that Fortune is the arbiter of a half of our actions while leaving to us to control the other half or so.

I compare Fortune to one of those raging rivers that, while flooding the plains, tear down trees and buildings, and sweep the soil from one place to deposit it in another. Everybody flies before it; all yield to its violence without being able in any way to withstand it. Yet it does not follow that what is sometimes violent cannot become serene. Therefore, when the river is tranquil, men can take precautions, constructing dykes and embankments in such a manner that, rising again, the waters might pass away by canal and their force would be neither so unrestrained nor so dangerous. The same happens with Fortune. She turns her power where no other well-regulated power has prepared to resist her. She always turns her forces where she knows that barriers and defenses have not been raised to constrain her.

If you will consider Italy, the theater of those changes I mentioned, you will see it to be an open country without barriers and without any defense. For if Italy had been properly reinforced (like Germany, Spain, and France), either this invasion would not have caused the great changes it has or it would not have come at all.

I wish what I have said would be enough to say in general terms concerning resistance to Fortune. However, confining self now to particulars, I say that some princes may be seen happy one day and ruined the next, without having apparent changes of character or disposition. I believe, this arises, firstly, from causes that have already been discussed at length, namely, that princes who rely entirely upon Fortune are lost when it changes. I also believe that they will be successful who direct their actions according to the spirit of the times, and that they whose actions do not accord with the times will not prosper.

It can be observed that men use varies policies in pursuing their own usual goals -- glory and riches. A man proceeds with caution, another with haste; one patiently, another impatiently; one uses force, another skill, and yet everyone, for all this diversity of methods, can reach his goal by a different method. One can also see of two cautious men the one attain his end, the other fail; and similarly, two men by different observances are equally successful, the one being cautious, the other impetuous; all this arises from nothing else than whether or not they conform in their methods to the spirit of the times. This follows from what I have said, that two men working differently bring about the same effect, and of two working similarly, one attains his object and the other does not.

Changes in property also derive from this, for if a man behaves with caution and patience and the time and circumstances are such that his method and goal converge, he will prosper; but if time and circumstances change, he will be ruined if he does not change either his goal or method. But a man is not often found sufficiently knowledgeable and able to accommodate himself to the change, both because he cannot deviate from what nature inclines him to, and also because, having always prospered by acting in one way, he cannot be persuaded that it is well to leave it. Thus, the cautious man, when it is time to turn adventurous, does not know how to do it, hence he is ruined; but had he changed his conduct with the time and circumstances, then his fortune would have not changed.

Pope Julius II rushed with violence in all his affairs, and he found the time and circumstances conform so well to his policy that he always met with success. Consider his first campaign against Bologna, when Messer Giovanni Bentivoglio was still alive. Neither the Venetians agreed to it nor the king of Spain. Julius was still arguing about the enterprise with the king of France, when, with typical forcefulness and impatience, he personally launched the expedition. This move made Spain and the Venetians stand irresolute and passive, the latter from fear and the former from desire to re-conquer all the kingdom of Naples. On the other hand, he drew the king of France after him, because that king, having observed the movement, and desiring to make the pope his friend so as to humble the Venetians, found it impossible to refuse him soldiers without manifestly offending him. Therefore, Julius with his impatient and violent action accomplished what no other pontiff with simple human wisdom could have done. For if he had waited in Rome until he could get away, with his plans arranged and everything fixed, as any other pontiff would have done, he would never have succeeded. Because the king of France would have made a thousand excuses, and the others would have inspired Julius with a thousand fears.

I will leave his other actions alone, as they were all alike, and they all succeeded, for the shortness of his life did not let him experience the contrary; but if circumstances had arisen that required him to go cautiously, his ruin would have followed, because he would never have deviated from those ways to which nature inclined him.

I conclude, therefore, that Fortune is changeful and that mankind is steadfast in their ways. Unless the two agree -- men are successful. However, men are unsuccessful when those two fall apart. For my part, I consider that it is better to be adventurous than cautious, because fortune is a woman, and if you wish to keep her under it is necessary to beat and ill-use her; and it is seen that she allows herself to be mastered by the adventurous rather than by those who go to work more coldly. She is, therefore, always, woman-like, a lover of young men, because they are less cautious, more violent, and with more audacity command her.

XXVI. AN ADMONITION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS

HAVING carefully considered the subject of the above discourses and wondering whether the present-day Italy is favorable to a new prince, and whether there are the elements that will give an opportunity to a wise and virtuous one to introduce a new order of things, bringing honor to self and prosperity to all Italians, it is apparent that so many things concur to favor a new prince that I cannot imagine a time more fit than the present.

As I said earlier, if the Hebrews had to be captive in Egypt so as they could choose Moses as their leader. If the Persians had to be oppressed by the Medes so as they could recognize the greatness of the soul of Cyrus. If the Athenians had to be dispersed to illustrate the excellence of Theseus -- then, in order to discover the power of an Italian spirit, it was necessary that Italy had to be reduced to the present extremity. She had to be more enslaved than the Hebrews, more oppressed than the Persians, more scattered than the Athenians. Leaderless, lawless, beaten, despoiled, torn, overrun – she had to have endured every kind of desolation.

Although lately one may have showed some spark, which made us think God ordained him for our redemption, it was afterward seen, in the height of his career, that Fortune rejected him [probably Cesare Borgia, VS]. Thereafter, Italy left lifeless, waiting to see who can be the one to heal her wounds, put an end to the ravaging and plundering of Lombardy, to the swindling and extortion in the kingdom and in the Tuscany, and cleanse those sores that have been festering for so long. Seen how Italy begs God to send someone to safe her from those barbarous cruelties and atrocities. See how eager and willing the country is to follow a banner, if only someone will raise it.

Italy has no one at present, in whom she can place more hope than in your illustrious dynasty, with its valor and fortune, favored by God and by the Church, of which it is now the head, can lead the country to salvation. This task will not be difficult if you will recall the actions and lives of the men I have mentioned. They were great and exceptional, yet they were men, and each of them had no more opportunity than the present situation offers, for their enterprises were neither more just nor easier than this, nor was God more their friend than He is yours.

There is great justice in our cause, ‘because a necessary war is a just war, and where there is hope only in arms, those arms are holy’ [Machiavelli is quoting Livy, VS]. There is the greatest willingness, and where the willingness is great the difficulties cannot be great, provided only your dynasty will imitate those men who I have singled out for admiration. As well as this, unheard of wonders are to be seen, performed by God: the sea is divided, a cloud has led the way, the rock has poured forth water, it has rained manna, everything has contributed to your greatness; the rest is up to you. God is not willing to do everything, and thus, take away our free will and that share of glory that belongs to us.

It is not to be wondered at that none of the above-mentioned Italians has accomplished all that what is expected from your illustrious dynasty. In so many Italian revolutions and in so many campaigns, it has appeared as if our military virtue were exhausted. This happened because the old military organization was bad, and there has been no one who knew how to establish a new one. Nothing brings a man greater honor than the new laws and institutions he establishes. Such things, when they are well founded and bear the seal of greatness, will make him revered and admired.

Present-day Italy has opportunities for thorough reorganization. Here we would find great valor in the limbs while it lacks in the head. Look at the duels and the hand-to-hand combats, how superior the Italians are in strength, in skill, and in improvisation. However, when it comes to armies, they do not stand comparisons. This springs entirely from the defective leaders since those who are capable are not obedient. Everyone imagines he is competent, and hitherto, no one has had the competence to dominate the others by his valor or fortune. Hence, over so long a time and during so much fighting in the past twenty years, whenever there has been an exclusively Italian army, it has always got a bad name, as witness the battles of Taro, Alessandria, Capua, Genoa, Vaila, Bologna, and Mestre.

Therefore, if your illustrious dynasty wants to imitate those remarkable men who have saved their country, it is necessary, before all else, to raise a citizen army, because there can be no more loyal, more truthful, or better soldiers. Although singly they are good, altogether they will be much better when their prince, who will honor and maintained them at his own expense, commands them. Therefore, it is necessary to raise such an army that we can defend selves against the invaders based on Italian valor.

Although Swiss and Spanish infantry may be considered very formidable, there is a defect in both. The opposite of that defect would enable a third kind of army not only to stop the invaders, but might be relied upon to conquer them. For the Spaniards cannot resist cavalry, and the Swiss men are afraid of infantry whenever they encounter them in close combat. It has been found that the Spaniards are unable to resist French cavalry and Spanish infantry overthrows the Swiss men. Although a complete proof of this assertion cannot be demonstrated, there was some evidence of it at the battle of Ravenna, where the Spanish infantry confronted with German battalions, who follow the same tactics as the Swiss. When the Spaniards, by agility of body and with the aid of their shields, got in under the pikes of the Germans and stood out of danger, able to attack, while the Germans were defenseless. If the cavalry had not dashed up, all would have been over for the Germans. It is possible, therefore, knowing the defects of both these infantries, to invent a new one, which will resist cavalry and not be afraid of infantry. This new type of infantry would not be a completely new organization of army, but a variation upon the old. This kind of improvements brings a new prince greatness and prestige.

Therefore, letting Italy at last to see her liberator appear, the present opportunity should not be allowed to slip. I cannot express with what love he would be welcomed in all those provinces, which have suffered so much from these foreign invaders, with what thirst for revenge, with what resolute loyalty, with what devotion and tears. What door would be closed to him? Who would refuse to obey him? What envy would hinder him? What Italian would refuse him loyalty? To all of us this barbarous dominion stinks.

Let your illustrious dynasty take up this charge with that courage and hope, with which all just enterprises are undertaken; so that, under your standard, our country may be ennobled, and under your auspices, what Petrarch said may come to pass:

Virtue against fury shall advance the fight,
And it in the combat soon shall put to flight;
For the old Roman, valor is not dead,
Nor in the Italians' breasts extinguished.

10/20/00

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Victor J. Serge created this page and revised it on 04/10/03